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CHAPTER 1 
TOWARDS THE HARMONISATION OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAWS IN 
THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY (SADC) 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The movement towards globalisation has brought about the need for countries to depend on 
each other. As a result of this there is now a great number of International Organisations 
which have been created to deal with the different global issues such as the World Trade 
Organisation, the International Labour Organisation, and the World Health Organisation 
amongst others. In addition to the global organisations there has also been a proliferation of 
regional agreements in the past years.
1
 Regional integration is the process by which two or 
more nation-states agree to co-operate and work closely together to achieve peace, stability 
and wealth.
2
 Its importance has resonated in the area of trade with its significance brought out 
in articles XXIV of GATT
3
 and V of GATS.
4
 It has become a means to increase 
competitiveness in global trade, enhance negotiating capacities, improve access to foreign 
investment, and to help integrate countries in regional groupings into the world economy.
5
  
For instance, in relation to the aspect of the increase of competiveness these agreements make 
provision for the preferential treatment of developing countries in trade.
6
 These provisions 
seek to afford the less developed countries an opportunity to trade with each other and in so 
doing try to promote trade among the developing countries. This allows them to combine 
national markets into a single market and thereby have better competition leading to 
diversification as well as attract foreign investment in the continent.
7
 
                                                 
 
1
 Carlsnaes W etal  Handbook of International Relations (2002) ch 25 
2
 EU learning available at  http://carleton.ca/ces/eulearning/introduction/what-is-the-eu/extension-what-is-
regional-integration / (accessed 18 April 2014) 
3
  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
4
 General Agreement on Trade in Services 1995 
5
 Buthelezi Regional Integration in Africa: Prospects and challenges for the 21st Century (2006) 54. 
6
 Article 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 
7
 Mupangavanhu Y The Regional Integration Of African Trade Mark Laws: Challenges And Possibilities 
(unpublished thesis University of the Western Cape 2012)33 
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Furthermore, it is argued that regional integration is one of the rational responses to the 
challenges faced by continents with many small national markets and landlocked countries.
8
  
It is argued that migration from the landlocked countries such as Zimbabwe to the coastal 
economy South Africa through the implementation of SADC Protocols for example allowing 
freedom of movement of people would close the wage gap and bring efficiency gains to the 
region.
9
 However this has its challenges because of the obligation that the country has to its 
own people before allowing people from other countries to access jobs. 
 
As a result of the high number of regional agreements the harmonisation of laws has become 
an important tool in some of the regions so as to ensure the proper functioning of regional 
organisations.  In regions such as the European Union there is a great deal of harmonised 
laws in different issues such as banking law, trade laws and corporate governance laws 
amongst others.  Similarly, in Africa the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law 
(OHADA) also boasts of a robust system of business laws and implementing institutions 
adopted by sixteen West and Central African nations.
10
 The Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) also has a number of Protocols on Investment and Trade amongst others 
but it does not have any framework in the field of corporate governance. 
 
Corporate governance is argued to have become as important in the world economy as the 
government of countries.
11
 It is because of the global financial crisis which was attributed to 
issues of corporate governance that it has become very important so as to avoid a repetition of 
the crisis.
12
 During the crisis boards of most banks and companies failed to consider risk 
factors before approving the company strategy which meant that companies‟ disclosures on 
foreseeable risk factors and monitoring as well as managing risk were lacking in many 
banks.
13
 It is argued that the financial crisis exposed the inadequacy of the corporate 
governance because it did not serve it purpose of safeguarding against this excessive risk 
                                                 
 
8
 Hartzenberg T „Regional Integration in Africa‟ Staff Working Paper ERSD (2011)2 
9
 De Melo J and Tsikata Y ´Regional integration in Africa :Challenges and prospects` United Nations University 
Wider Woking Paper (2014) 9 
10
 Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Law in Africa Treaty 1997 
11
 Breandle C et al ‘ Development of Corporate Governance‟ available at 
http://www.virtuspress.org/.../sample_chapter01    (accessed 14 January 2015) 
12
 Kumar N and  Singh L  „Global Financial Crisis: Corporate Governance Failures and Lessons‟  
Journal of Finance, Accounting and Management Volume (2013)25 
13
 Kumar N and  Singh L  „Global Financial Crisis: Corporate Governance Failures and Lessons‟  
Journal of Finance, Accounting and Management Volume (2013)25 
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taking in a number of financial services companies.
14
 It is further argued that the framework 
proved to be insufficient when it came to accounting standards and regulatory requirements.
15
 
One can argue that if corporate governance has become so important in the global economy 
especially in the western countries it is also needed in Africa, particularly the SADC region 
as shall be shown throughout this paper. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Arthur Levitt the former chairman of the US Securities and Exchange Commission once said 
that: 
„If a country does not have a reputation for strong corporate governance practices, 
capital will flow elsewhere. If investors are not confident of the level of disclosure, 
capital will flow elsewhere. If a country opts for lax accounting and reporting 
standards, capital will flow elsewhere.‟16  
This statement is a reflection of the challenges that countries with poor corporate governance 
face in terms of investments because investors are unwilling to invest in their countries.
17
. 
Some SADC countries face this threat, for instance a concrete example of a subpar 
framework would be that of Zimbabwe. It is only recently that a draft National Code for 
Corporate Governance (NCCG) framework which will guide and govern how Zimbabwean 
companies will be directed and controlled is now complete and currently going through 
refinement.
18
 This can also be seen in the example of Lesotho as well which does not have 
very good corporate governance where in a report by the Africa Development Bank (AFDB) 
raised issues on the protection of minority shareholders as well as the outdatedness of the 
legal framework dealing with corporate governance. Similarly, Malawi is also in need of 
                                                 
 
14
 Kirkpatrick G „The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis‟ Financial Market Trends 
Pre-publication version for Vol.1 (2009)1 
15
 Kirkpatrick G „The Corporate Governance Lessons from the Financial Crisis‟ Financial Market Trends 
Pre-publication version for Vol.1 (2009)1 
16
 Muradzikwa S  „Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper‟ (2002)14 
17
 Muradzikwa S „Development Policy Research Unit Working Paper‟ (2000)14 
18
 A national code for corporate governance available at  http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2012/10/05/a-
national-code-for-corporate-governance/ (accessed on 16 January 2014) 
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improvements to its corporate governance after it was assessed and found that it was found to 
be nascent.
19
 
 
Whereas on the other hand, South Africa boasts of the King Code III which follows what is 
referred to as the „enlightened shareholder‟ model as well as the „stakeholder inclusive‟ 
model of corporate governance, meaning that the board of directors should also consider the 
legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders other than shareholders.
20
 This is a very 
robust system in line with international standards. Similarly, Swaziland is also in line with the 
international standards and boasts of provisions that protect minority shareholder rights and 
sixty percent of OECD principles of corporate governance in their Companies Act of 2009.
21
  
Henceforth, in light of these differences arises the need for SADC as a regional unit to 
improve and level the playing field in terms of the governance of companies through 
harmonising corporate governance laws. 
 
Moreover, the issue of predictability of laws is also a very important objective to the cause of 
regional integration in SADC. However, one of the challenges facing this envisaged outcome 
is that of different legal systems in the region due to the influence of colonial laws. SADC 
has about 4 different systems amongst its membership, namely civil, common law, hybrid 
system (Civil and Common law) and the Roman-Dutch system. Botswana, South Africa, 
Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Swaziland make use of a Roman-Dutch system, Angola, 
Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo and Madagascar subscribe to Civil Law 
Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi and Mauritius are Common Law jurisdictions 
22
 and Seychelles 
uses a hybrid system.
23
 Each of these countries also comprises of other many different 
systems of law, especially including traditional customary laws.
24
 This translates into an 
                                                 
 
19
 „Promoting the APRM Codes and Standards on Corporate Governance in Southern Africa‟ http://www.iag-
agi.org/IMG/doc/paper_governance_in_southern_africa_final_draft.doc. (accessed 13 September 2013) 
20
 Corporate and Commercial/King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 
21
 Kabir H ´Swaziland corporate governance with regard to the new Companies Act of 2009` Procedia - Social 
and Behavioral Sciences Journal Volume 25 (2011)45 
22
 Ndulo N „The Need for the Harmonisation of Trade Laws in SADC‟, Cornell Law Faculty Publications 
(1996) 196 
23
 Syechelles legal system available at http://www.actoffshore.co/about-seychelles/legal-system accessed on 18 
March 2015 
24
 Ndulo N „The Need for the Harmonisation of Trade Laws in SADC‟, Cornell Law Faculty Publications 
(1996) 196 
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obstacle to regional investments as there is no uniform set system of laws in SADC dealing 
with trade, and especially corporate governance amongst other issues.  
 
In relation to corporate governance, civil laws give investors weaker legal rights than 
common laws do.
25
 The most striking difference is between common law countries, which 
give both shareholders and creditors the relatively speaking strongest protections, and French 
civil law countries, which protect investors the least.
26
 This does not assure investors to invest 
in countries with subpar laws which do not protect their interests thus impacting on the 
foreign direct investment of the region. 
  
1.3 Rationale of the study 
 
In terms of the SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP), the main 
objective of the community is to achieve a monetary union through the creation of a regional 
central bank by 2016 and adoption of a single currency by 2018 in a systematic and 
progressive manner.
27
 The envisaged monetary union in the SADC is premised on a number 
of economic and financial regulations aimed at stimulating efforts by member states to 
achieve deeper forms of regional integration.
28
 The latter imperatives include a harmonised 
payment system as well as a corporate governance system among others. Nonetheless it is 
surprising how the pace of the process has been very subpar taking into consideration that it 
is the year 2015 and there has been no clear carved out legislation in any form which deals 
with the aspect of corporate governance raises concerns. 
 
This study serves as not only a reminder but also gives guidelines to taking progressive steps 
towards harmonised systems of law to ensure the efficient running of companies in SADC. 
This study is predicated upon other successful systems and the lessons that SADC could 
make use of as examples in creating a robust system of laws to ensure good corporate 
governance and in the long run the fulfilment of the concept of a monetary union. 
 
                                                 
 
25
 The National Bureau of Economic Research working paper  5661(1996)5 
26
 The National Bureau of Economic Research working paper 5661 (1996)5 
27
 SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 1999 
28
 SADC Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan 1999 
 
 
 
 
  
6 
 
 
 
1.4 Research Objectives 
 
The paper seeks to discuss harmonisation as a medium to the removal of poor corporate 
governance practises in SADC countries.  
 
The question is how can a system of common corporate governance regulation be achieved in 
SADC? 
 
Harmonisation of laws will act as a levelling ground between companies in different 
countries with different corporate governance.
29
 It will allow for the improvement of laws in 
the countries with out-dated systems and those with poor systems.
30
 It will also enhance 
accessibility and predictability of corporate governance laws, because of this single body of 
laws in the region investors or companies will be aware of the laws hence allowing the 
establishment of foreign companies and further investment in existing companies. This study 
shall look at international laws around corporate governance and also how other regional 
blocks have gone about implementing harmonised laws. The latter will provide 
recommendations on how to embark on the project of harmonising corporate governance 
laws in the SADC region.  
 
1.5 Research Methodology 
 
The thesis is a desktop examination of primary sources, such as the legislation of the selected 
regions, international instruments governing corporate governance as well as secondary 
sources such as textbooks, internet sources and journal articles. This thesis shall present 
evaluations of the harmonisation processes in the OECD, OHADA and EU countries. By so 
doing this will bring out strengths and weaknesses of each process so that there is an in depth 
understanding of the corporate governance laws in order to make well rounded 
recommendations. 
                                                 
 
29
 ShumbaT  Harmonising the Law of Sale in the Southern African Development Community (SADC): An 
Analysis of Selected Models(Unpublished thesis Stellenbosch University 2014)17 
30
 ShumbaT  Harmonising the Law of Sale in the Southern African Development Community (SADC): An 
Analysis of Selected Models(Unpublished thesis Stellenbosch University 2014)17 
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1.6 Chapter Outline 
 
Chapter 1 discusses the need for harmonisation in corporate law in SADC, the challenges and 
problems possibly to be faced in the process of harmonisation. 
 
Chapter 2 will provide the theoretical framework of the study through discussing 
harmonisation, SADC and Corporate Governance. 
 
Chapter 3 will discuss the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance as a blueprint which 
can be followed. It will the tools of the OECD and examine how it has been important in the 
creation of harmonised laws in non-member countries of the OECD. 
 
Chapter 4 will question whether the OHADA laws could serve as a model for harmonisation 
in the SADC region and whether SADC Member States should join the OHADA or merely 
use the OHADA Uniform Acts as a model for creating a harmonised system of corporate 
governance. 
 
Chapter 5 will focus on the European harmonised laws on corporate governance. It shall 
examine the different regulations or directives which have been enacted within the EU and 
whether these could be used as recommendations for SADC. 
 
In Chapter 6 conclusions and recommendations will be presented on the harmonisation of 
corporate governance in the SADC region. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The concept of corporate governance as mentioned in the previous chapter has now become 
very important in the global economy following the events of the global financial crisis of 
2008. Some SADC countries such as Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Malawi among others are not 
in tandem with the developments in corporate governance.
31
 This chapter will discuss the 
concept of corporate governance in terms of its theories, the concept of harmonisation and 
lastly will look at the institutional make up of SADC to explore the feasibility of the 
harmonisation of corporate governance in the SADC region. 
 
2.2 Corporate Governance  
 
The concept of corporate governance has been very important to the running of companies 
for a very long time. It is said to be as old as the history of corporations.
32
 Until the beginning 
of the 17th century partnerships were the dominant form for organising jointly owned 
business firms.
33
  It was later with the growth of business in these partnerships that the entity 
called a corporation was created so as to raise capital for the bigger businesses.
34
 This was 
due to the risk that the owners incurred in running the business because they were practically 
the business which meant that the losses of the business were also theirs. Thus there was a 
great need for separation between them and the business through the Limited Liability Act in 
Britain 1855.
35
  
 
                                                 
 
31
 „Promoting the APRM Codes and Standards on Corporate Governance in Southern Africa‟ http://www.iag-
agi.org/IMG/doc/paper_governance_in_southern_africa_final_draft.doc. (accessed 13 September 2013) 
32
 Breandle C etal ‘ Development of Corporate Governance‟ available at  
http://www.virtuspress.org/.../sample_chapter01    (accessed 14 January 2015) 
33
 Breandle C etal ‘ Development of Corporate Governance‟ available at  
http://www.virtuspress.org/.../sample_chapter01    (accessed 14 January 2015) 
34
 Adelopo I „ Auditing, Corporate Governance and Market Confidence‟ available at 
http://www.ashgate.com.../Auditor- (accessed 14 January 2015)                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
35
 Farrar, J.H „A Brief Thematic History of Corporate Governance,‟ Bond Law Review: Vol. 11: Iss. 2, Article 9 
(1999) 259 
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Due to the creation of companies and the concept of limited liability which meant that the 
company was a separate entity there was a need for this new entity to be governed.
36
 In 1932 
Berle and Merlings‟ study into the operation of the company entities spearheaded this 
concept of corporate governance.
37
 They identified some of the major problems that came 
along with the division between ownership and management which are reflected in the 
statement below,      
„Management, in the absence of a countervailing power, have a tendency to   
pursue their self-interest at the expense of the corporation‟38 
In the above statement one finds that there was a necessity for companies and countries to 
have laws and rules in place in order to prevent the pursuit of self- interest, hence the laws 
regulating corporate governance were and are of great importance.  
 
2.2.1 Theories on Corporate Governance 
 
In view of the different needs of companies and due to the financial crises the concept of 
corporate governance evolved to meet the new requirements. There are different theories or 
approaches of corporate governance that exist. An understanding of these theories would be 
important in choosing which model SADC has to make use of in order to be competitive in 
getting investment as well as safeguarding the interests of parties involved with the company 
entity. 
 
2.2.1.1 Agency Theory 
 
The Agency theory is also known as the narrow view of corporate governance and it refers to 
the formal system of accountability of the board of directors to its shareholders (owners of 
the business) with the purpose of maximising profits for the benefit of shareholders.
39
 In 
terms of this theory the managers of the company take the role of agents whilst the 
                                                 
 
36
 Cassim MF Contemporary Company law 2edition Juta Law (2012) ch 2 
37
 Adelopo I „ Auditing, Corporate Governance and Market Confidence‟ available at 
http://www.ashgate.com.../Auditor- (accessed 14 January 2015)  
38
 Farrar, J.H „A Brief Thematic History of Corporate Governance,‟ Bond Law Review: Vol. 11: Iss. 2, Article 9 
(1999) 260 
39
 Koma SB „Conceptualization and Contextualization of Corporate Governance in the South African Public 
Sector: Issues, Trends and Prospect’ Journal of Public Administration, Vol.44, N.o.3 (2009) 4   
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shareholders as a group are the principal.
40
 The agency theory is said to be flawed because it 
assumes that the managers who are the agents will almost always act in the interest of the 
shareholders as opposed to acting in their own interest which is not necessarily the 
case.
41
This can be seen in the Enron case where the managers concealed the real value of the 
company so that the company could get more investments and be seen as a big company thus, 
the managers would profit from the company‟s system of compensation which was designed 
to retain and reward its most valuable employees.
42
 It also poses the threat of shareholders 
preventing the managers from using their discretion in issues where they must be afforded 
this due to their expertise.
43
 However, though shareholder restraint on the discretion of the 
directors may sound draconian one can argue that it minimises reckless decisions by the 
directors and the taking of unnecessary risks which is one of the reasons for the 2008 
economic meltdown.
44
 
 
2.2.1.2 Stewardship Theory 
 
This theory is premised on the notion that managers are to act as good stewards holding the 
company in trust for the owners and furthering their interest without an individualistic 
motive.
45
 It is argued that in order for one to be a steward, psychological factors such as 
motivation and personal will should steer the manager‟s choice to be a steward.46 
The theory assumes that the steward, who was the agent in the previous theory, perceives that 
the gains from collaborative behaviour with the principal are higher than gains which are 
gained by the agent through self-serving behaviour.
47
 This ensures that there is minimal 
                                                 
 
40
 Solomon J Corporate Governance and Accountability 2
nd
 edition (2007)17 
41
 Solomon J Corporate Governance and Accountability 2
nd
 edition (2007)17 
42
 „Presenting the Enron Case: Testing the Agency Theory: Re-evaluating the Shareholder and Management 
Trust relationship‟ available at http://www.geocities.ws/yourwritingspecialist/Thesis.doc. (accessed on 13 
September 2015) 
43
 Clarke T Theories of Corporate Governance : The Philosophical Foundation of Corporate Governance 
(2004)4 
44
 Kumar N and  Singh L  „Global Financial Crisis: Corporate Governance Failures and Lessons‟  
Journal of Finance, Accounting and Management Volume (2013)25 
45
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conflict between the agent and principal as they are ad idem on the agenda as well as the 
goals of the company.
48
 However it can be argued that it is far-fetched that in a region with 
high corruption like SADC agents / stewards will act solely in the interests of the principal 
and not in self-interest. 
 
2.2.1.3 The Stakeholder Theory  
 
The Stakeholder theory which is sometimes regarded as corporate governance in its broadest 
sense refers to the informal and formal relationship between the corporate sector and its 
stakeholders (creditors, suppliers, customers, trade unions, civil society groups, together with 
the impact of the corporate sector on society in general).
49
  This type of corporate governance 
can be seen through examples such as of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Guidelines which embody the principles of the stakeholder model of 
corporate governance.
50
 It is argued that it has become a global benchmark on corporate 
governance and countries, either members or non-members, as well as the World Bank and 
the International Corporate Governance Network have endorsed its good corporate 
governance principles. 
51
 One can argue that this theory champions the concept of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR). 
„Corporate Social Responsibility is the continuing commitment by business to behave 
ethically and contribute to economic development while improving the quality of life 
of the workforce and their families as well as of the local community and society at 
large‟52 
This can be seen through the commitment that the stakeholder theory has to the interests of 
stakeholders including employees and the society which is what CSR is about. In relation to 
the harmonisation of SADC corporate governance this paper will evaluate as well as give 
recommendations which are in line with this model of stakeholder corporate governance. 
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2.3 Harmonisation 
 
In order to understand the concept of harmonisation of laws this paper shall make a few 
comparisons of it to that of unification. Unification seeks to suppress the differences and 
conflicts of form and make them compatible with the objectives of the region.
53
 It is the total 
substitution of two or more legal systems with one legal system.
54
 For instance in OHADA 
unification is achieved through Uniform Laws where countries are directly bound by the 
uniform laws as well as in the case of the Regulations of the European Union.
55
 It has the 
characteristics of hard law where these laws are binding to the member states and must be 
applied regardless of conflict between them and the national law. 
 
Harmonisation on the other hand is more subtle and is a process of ascertaining uniformity 
not through unification but through reducing the differences in the law.
56
 It is argued that it is 
a way of achieving standardisation of the legal system with minimal interference with the 
sovereignty of member states.
57
 It has nuances of the soft law approach usually achieved 
through voluntary and non-binding forms of law such as norms, model laws, 
recommendations and guidelines.
58
 An example of such would be the Contracts for the 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) as well as the OECD Guidelines which will be discussed 
the next chapter. Hence harmonisation offers Member States the choice of implementing the 
harmonised regional law in a way that fits in with their own circumstances. In view of the 
above it can be argued that it best suits SADC which is a region which has problems with 
authority as shall be discussed below in relation to the disbanding of the Tribunal.   
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2.4 The Southern African Development Community 
 
In order to establish the plausibility of harmonisation in SADC corporate governance law one 
must scrutinise the organisation itself. The Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) of today first started as was the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC), which was formed in on 1 April 1980 in the capital of Zambia, Lusaka 
with the first states being Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
59
 However, it changed from the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference (SADCC) into the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC) after the signing of the SADC Treaty in 1992.
60
 It now comprises the following 
member states: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe.
61
   
 
2.4.1 Objectives of SADC 
 
In terms of Article 5 of the Southern African Development Community Treaty of 1997, the 
role of SADC is to: promote sustainable and equitable economic growth and socio-economic 
development that will ensure poverty alleviation with the ultimate objective of its eradication; 
enhance the standard and quality of life of the people of Southern Africa and support the 
socially disadvantaged through regional integration; promote common political values, 
systems and other shared values which are transmitted through institutions which are 
democratic, legitimate and effective; consolidate, defend and maintain democracy, peace, 
security and stability; promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-
reliance, and the interdependence of Member States; achieve complementarity between 
national and regional strategies and programmes; promote and maximise productive 
employment and utilisation of resources of the region; achieve sustainable utilisation of 
natural resources and effective protection of the environment; strengthen and consolidate the 
long standing historical, social and cultural affinities and links among the people of the 
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region; combat HIV/AIDS or other deadly and communicable diseases; ensure that poverty 
eradication is addressed in all SADC activities and programmes; and mainstream gender 
issues in the process of community building.
62
 
 
Article 5(2) of the SADC treaty explains how these objectives are to be achieved and 
particularly in relation to the  progressive elimination of obstacles to the free movement of 
capital and labour, goods and services, and of the people of the Region generally, among 
Member States.
63
 One of the obstacles to the injection of capital in SADC is that there are 
poor corporate governance laws for example Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Malawi. South Africa 
has the King Code III which is highly rated in Africa while Swaziland and Mauritius have 
budding corporate governance regimes alongside most of the other states.
64
 The answer 
would be the improvement of these law as well as eliminating the differences through a 
collective effort of harmonisation of the corporate governance laws of the region. 
Harmonisation is in line with the objectives of SADC and there is mention of harmonisation 
of political and socio- economic policy as well as in the field of international relations. One 
can see examples of such harmonisation in the Protocol on Trade,
65
 the Protocol on Trade in 
Services
66
 as well as policies like the Harmonised Seed Regulation System which is a set of 
rules, standards and procedures necessary to facilitate the movement of seed between 
countries in the region.
67
  
Furthermore, in line with the objectives of harmonisation, in 2009 in a paper by United 
Nations Economic Commission for Africa, Governance of Financial Institutions in Southern 
Africa: Issues for an Institutional Convergence Framework for Regional Financial 
Integration in SADC there is mention of a harmonised system of corporate governance 
through integration of laws in the Central Bank model law so as to govern financial 
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institutions.
68
 This paper also makes mention of the plan that SADC has to include corporate 
governance practices in the Central Bank model law so as to ensure the accountability of the 
members of the central bank in the decisions they make.
69
  The paper also discusses the 
importance of transparency in the Central Bank‟s corporate governance so as to ensure that 
bank provides sufficient information to the people at all times through media briefings, 
Interactive websites and publish bulletins about their activities.
70
  Therefore, it can be noted 
that corporate governance is in tandem with the objectives of SADC and though the above 
explanation deals only with the Central Bank it is important in all sectors of business and this 
paper shall look at a general law which can be applied in different sectors. 
 
2.4.2 SADC Institutions 
 
In order to achieve harmonisation of corporate governance laws the depth and effectiveness 
of the institutions of SADC must be analysed so as to see the possible challenges as well as 
their role in this agenda. The institutions as per Article 9 of the Treaty are: Summit of Heads 
of State or Government; the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation; the Council 
of Ministers; the Tribunal; the Integrated Committee of Ministers; the Standing Committee of 
Officials; the Secretariat and the SADC National Committees.
71
 
 
2.4.2.1. The Summit 
 
The Summit is primarily responsible for the direction which SADC will assume in its 
policy.
72
 It comprises of the Heads of States of the Member States.
73
 The Summit also 
appoints Council Executives and decides on the admission of new members.
74
 Of importance 
with regards to the issue of harmonisation of corporate governance or any other law is the 
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provision in terms of Article 22 which affords the summit the power to adopt legal 
instruments for the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty; or it may delegate this 
authority to the Council or any other institution of SADC as the Summit may deem 
appropriate.
75
 If the need for the improvement of corporate governance laws is listed as an 
issue then it is this Summit with the power to adopt a Protocol on Corporate Governance law 
to the countries. However, one has to be mindful of the fact that there will be no enforcement 
mechanism with the new position regarding the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which is 
discussed below. Furthermore, adoption of a protocol requires a majority of two thirds of the 
Member States to ratify or sign the agreement and with other countries already having good 
frameworks this would be a problem.
76
 This paper will give the alternatives that can be taken 
in face of these challenges to ensure the harmonisation of SADC corporate governance law. 
 
2.4.2.2 Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Co-operation 
 
The Organ is tasked with the responsibility of promoting peace and security across Southern 
Africa, protecting the region‟s people from instability due to the breakdown of law and order, 
developing a common foreign policy throughout the region, and cooperating on matters 
related to security and defence.
77
 It also includes the co-ordination of the participation of its 
members in international and regional peacekeeping operations, addressing extra-regional 
conflicts which impact on peace and security in Southern Africa.
78
 It is comprised of 3 
committees which are: Ministerial Committee of the Organ (MCO) which consists of the 
Ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Public and State Security and it reports to the chair as 
well as oversee that plans of the organ.
79
 It also has the Interstate Defence and Security 
Committee which is subcommittees of the above comprising of Director Generals and 
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Permanent Secretaries.
80
 The last one is the Inter-state, Politics and Diplomacy Committee 
which comprises of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
81
 
  
2.4.2.3 Council and Integrated Committee of Ministers 
 
It consists of at least two Ministers from the member states and assumes among other 
responsibilities that of: overseeing the activities of the core areas of integration in trade, 
finance, investment etc.
82
 These duties indirectly include corporate governance as it may 
hinder investment. So they have a quasi-duty to also oversee the state of corporate 
governance and recommend the harmonisation as a platform to improve company governance 
in a bid to improve investment. It can also be suggested that since corporate governance law 
has such an impact an amendment of the Protocol on Finance and Investment
83
 to include 
corporate governance could be a way to harmonise corporate governance in SADC. 
Moreover, the Council has a mandate to monitor and control the implementation of the 
Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan.
84
  As shall be mentioned below the region is 
failing to meet its goals and there is a need to address this and improve integration and law 
important to the ideal of a regional Bank amongst other objectives. The Council is aided by 
the Integrated Committee of Ministers which is also comprised of 2 Ministers of each 
member state.
85
 It is has more of the same duties as that of the Committee which may raise 
questions of whether it is just a duplication or allows for more interaction in the members to 
ensure the reaching the objectives of SADC. One can argue that SADC is a small region and 
should have lesser institutions in order to ensure more efficiency in meeting its objectives and 
thus duplications such as these are not of much help to the region. 
 
2.4.2.4 Tribunal 
 
The Tribunal is tasked with the obligation to give advisory opinions on such matters as the 
Summit or the Council may refer to it and the decisions of the Tribunal are supposed to be 
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final and binding.
86
 However, it was suspended following the case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) 
Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe 
87
 concerning the land reform in Zimbabwe where 
the decision of the Tribunal was disregarded hence leading to it being disbanded.
88
 In 2014 
the new Protocol was signed by 9 countries out of the 15 members and is still not in force.
89
 
In Article 33 of the new Protocol it stipulates that the Tribunal will only have jurisdiction 
over the interpretation of the SADC Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between 
Member States.
90
 This Tribunal is very important in the application of a new harmonised 
corporate governance law but one has to take this with a pinch a salt because the Tribunal 
may further be dismantled if decisions go against countries not willing to implement the 
decision of the Tribunal. It has to be kept in mind that history may yet repeat itself or the 
countries which did not sign this new protocol may just decide to defy any decision by the 
Tribunal because it is yet again Zimbabwe which has not signed including South Africa. 
 
2.4.2.5 Standing Committee of Senior Officials 
 
The Standing Committee is an advisory committee to the Council.
91
 Apart from this task 
nothing much is said about this organ in terms of its mandate. The Standing Committee 
processes documentation from the Integrated Committee of Ministers to the Council. It has to 
report to and is accountable to the Council. The Committee meets four times a year.
92
  The 
call for harmonisation has been there in a number of issues in SADC, including Contract 
Law, Sales Law through various authors and now in this paper on harmonisation of corporate 
governance law it is the mandate of these officials to advice on the need of the speeding up of 
these processes amongst other pressing issues. 
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2.4.2.6 Secretariat 
 
For the purposes of this discussion the mandate of the Executive Secretary shall be discussed 
under the heading of the Secretariat.  The duties of the latter encompass strategic planning 
and management of the programmes of SADC; the coordination and harmonisation of the 
policies and strategies of Member States; the development of capacity, infrastructure and 
maintenance of intra-regional information communication technology and undertaking 
research on Community building and the integration process amongst many more other duties 
but these have been chosen because of the relevance to the issue at hand of a harmonised 
corporate governance statute.
93
 All above mentioned would be quite instrumental for instance 
research on the integration processes in successful regions such as Europe which this paper 
seeks to achieve and the coordination of the effort in the policies of the countries particularly 
those that lack in the field of corporate governance.The Executive Secretary performs duties 
which are identical to the ones of the Secretariat.
94
 The Secretary is appointed for a period of 
four years with the option of a renewal of another period not exceeding four years.
95
  
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
In view of the discussion above it can be concluded that if there is the political will in SADC 
and if these institutions are operating efficiently in their given roles it is not impossible to 
achieve the envisaged result of a harmonised law on corporate governance. SADC does show 
promise with Protocols such as the one on Trade and Trade in Services among others. In the 
next chapter this paper shall examine the OECD Principles on Corporate Governance and 
question how they can be of use in the process of the harmonisation of corporate governance 
in SADC. 
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CHAPTER 3 
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ORGANISATION FOR 
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (OECD) PRINCIPLES ON 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Principles on 
Corporate Governance are said to have become the international yardstick for corporate 
governance as they have successively formed the basis for a number of reform initiatives, 
both by governments and the private sector.
96
 The OECD definition of corporate governance 
has managed to rise to its influential position because of its hybrid nature due to the inclusion 
of both the broad and narrow definitions of corporate governance.
97
 The OECD defines 
corporate governance as the procedures and processes according to which an organisation is 
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights 
and responsibilities among the different participants in the organisation such as the board, 
managers, shareholders and other stakeholders and lays down the rules and procedures for 
decision-making.
98
 In rising up to this formidable force in the governance of a business, the 
OECD has developed internationally accepted standards, practices, guidelines and principles 
for corporate governance.
99
 The OECD‟s open ended set of guidelines have catapulted it into 
an internationally user friendly platform for dialogue in the promotion of corporate 
governance.
100
 In carrying out its mandate of solidification of corporate governance and 
drafting frameworks it has managed to share experiences across and within countries.  
The guidelines have managed to influence key corporate governance policies internationally 
and also in different countries such as South Africa in the form of the King Code III , the 
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Olivencia Code of Italy and the Peterson report in the USA.
101
 The abovementioned policies 
are evidence of the influence of the OECD guidelines.
102
  
 
This chapter will discuss the history and structure of the OECD guidelines on corporate 
governance in relation to their impact on the improvement of the corporate governance of 
non-members as well as internationally. Then it will explain the guidelines and critically 
evaluate the value of the OECD guidelines and finally determine whether the Guidelines will 
be helpful in the process of harmonising the corporate governance laws in SADC. 
 
3.2 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) 
 
The OECD came into existence in September 1961 with the mandate of improving the 
economic well-being of people but was initially known as the Organisation for European 
Economic Co-operation (OEEC) which was formed in 1948.
103
 The OEEC was formed in 
order to administer American and Canadian aid under the Marshall Plan for reconstruction of 
Europe in the aftermath of World War II.
104
 To date it has a membership that comprises of 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, Finland Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Korea and the Slovak Republic. 
105
  Since the 
establishment of the OECD it has been instrumental in issues of tax, multinational business, 
education, agriculture, anti-corruption, nuclear energy and corporate governance amongst 
other issues.
106
 In terms of the 1961 Convention the main function of the OECD is to ensure 
direct co-operation among the governments of its member countries.
107
 A brief outline of the 
OECD‟s structure is subsequently provided so as to understand the operation of the 
organisation. 
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3.2.1 Organisational Structure of the OECD 
 
The OECD is comprised of three structures which are the Council, Secretariat and the 
Committees which ensure the operation of the organisation.
108
 
 
3.2.1.1 The Council 
 
The OECD Council is made up of ambassadors from all member states and their function 
includes the guidance and control over the organisation: through authorising the Secretary 
General to direct the secretariat to scrutinise reports, adopt acts and look at subject matters to 
be discussed.
109
 It is also the most powerful decision-making organ in the OECD.
110
 It is 
tasked with the formulation of the overall goals of the OECD keeping in mind its future 
course.
111
 In terms of Article 8 the Council is mandated to elect a Chairman every year and 
his task is to preside at its ministerial sessions with the help of two Vice-Chairmen.
112
  It also 
takes on the responsibility for collective foreign policy issues, including the crucial area of 
relations with non-member countries
113
 which is very important for the purposes of this paper 
since Southern Africa Development Community members are not members of OECD. Hence 
if there are attempts to harmonise the SADC corporate law through consultation with the 
OECD there is a need for understanding between the latter and the Council. 
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3.2.1.2 The Committees 
 
The Committees consist of specialists from member countries tasked to deal with particular 
subject areas, such as, environment, investment, governance, tax among others.
114
 It also is 
highly populated by professional economists since the main objective of the organisation is 
economic liberalisation.
115
 The number of committees has risen to about 250 committees, 
working groups and expert groups.
116
 These are established by the Council in terms of Article 
9 of the convention in furthering the objectives of the OECD.
117
  For instance, the Executive 
Committee is mandated to contribute to work that will improve policy making through 
assisting the Council in the preparation of its decisions on reports and proposals.
118
 The 
Committees must have meetings with the Council to ensure dialogue and so as to report on 
their performance in respect of their achievement of expected goals.
119
 They have a more 
grass roots approach as they are more informed on the issues within countries and are very 
important to the operations of the OECD.  
 
3.2.1.3 The Secretariat 
 
Similarly, the secretariat consists of different professionals ranging from economists, 
scientists, lawyers, administrative staff and other professionals who support the work of the 
committees with research, analysis, data collection and policy recommendations.
120
 The latter 
is very important to the way that the OECD operates in ensuring the achievement of its goals 
in their different ventures.
121
 The secretariat identifies common ways to rank the compliance 
of countries to the Treaty as well as the guidelines.
122
 They do most of the ground work in 
operations of the OECD. It can be argued that it is mostly through the work of the Secretariat 
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that the Tax Convention, Guidelines on Money Laundering and most importantly the 
Guidelines on Corporate Governance have been published.  
 
3.3 OECD Principles on Corporate Governance  
 
The first of the OECD Guidelines on Corporate Governance came about as a result of the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997.
123
 The OECD Council in one of the Ministerial meetings called 
upon the OECD to formulate a set of corporate governance standards and guidelines.
124
 The 
principles were adopted in 1999 were later revised in 2004.
125
 They have been recently been 
updated in 2015 as well. The principles are widely recommended and have gained a lot of 
credibility as they have been recognised by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, 
and non-OECD countries, among others.
126
 
 
3.3.1 The Role of the OECD Principles on Corporate Governance  
 
The role of the OECD throughout has been to facilitate participants‟ access to the global 
policy dialogue to strengthen corporate governance and to set a framework for the sharing of 
experiences across and within countries.
127
  The OECD has developed standards, practices 
and guidelines together with the principles for corporate governance.
128
 They mainly apply or 
service publicly traded companies but also find a place in the governance of non-traded 
companies.
129
 The OECD formulated this set of principles so as to provide practical 
suggestions for stock exchanges, investors, corporations and other parties that have a role in 
the process of developing good corporate governance.
130
 Though the principles are not 
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binding on its members, they offer a standard of good practice.
131
 As per the preamble these 
principles are not intended to substitute or override the powers of the government, semi-
government or private sector initiatives to develop more detailed “best practice” in corporate 
governance.
132
  
 
3.3.2 The OECD Principles on Corporate Governance 1999 
 
In 1999 the OECD members agreed on the OECD principles on corporate governance and 
identified the following elements as vital to good corporate governance: I) The rights of 
shareholders; II) The equitable treatment of shareholders; III) The role of stakeholders; IV) 
Disclosure and transparency; and V) The responsibilities of the board.
133
  These elements 
have mostly been retained by the revised principles but however as a result of the global 
economic crisis including the Enron/Worldcom failures which pointed out deficiencies in 
accounting standards and issues surrounding the Audit Committee there was a need for the 
revision of the principles.
134
 Similarly, the Parmalat and Ahold cases in Europe also exposed 
the deficiencies in the OECD 1999 concerning corporate governance deficiencies which led 
to actions by international regulatory institutions such as International Organisation of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and by national authorities as well as a response from the 
OECD in terms of the 2004 principles.
135
 
 
3.3.3 The OECD Principles on Corporate Governance 2004 
 
In the revised version of the corporate governance guidelines the OECD, identified the 
following elements or mechanisms governing good corporate governance; I) Ensuring the 
basis for an effective corporate governance framework, II) the Right of shareholders and key 
ownership functions, III) The equitable treatment of shareholders, IV) deals with the role of 
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stakeholders, V) Disclosure transparency, VI) the responsibility of the board.
136
 The plight of 
the financial crisis was very important in the exposure of the extent of the failures and 
weaknesses in the 2004 OECD corporate governance arrangements.
137
 This crisis showed that 
when the guidelines such as those of the OECD on corporate governance were needed the 
most they failed to serve their mandate to safeguard against excessive risk, poor accounting 
standards insufficient regulatory systems as well poor remuneration strategies.
138
  
During the crisis the boards of most banks and companies failed to consider risk factors 
before approving the company strategy which meant that companies‟ disclosures on 
foreseeable risk factors and monitoring and managing risk were obviously lacking in many 
banks.
139
 Accounting and Regulatory environments were not transparent because complex 
financial products, like collateralised debt obligation were opaque in terms of their financial 
reporting to shareholders.
140
 
With regards to the remuneration policies for managers it is argued that they were designed in 
a manner that they led to unnecessary high-risk taking.
141
 The invectives included stock 
options and exit packages for top executives which allowed the executives to incur higher 
risk but still be rewarded regardless of their failures.
142
  This extreme risk taking was driven 
by this faulty remuneration structure which was driven by the need to make all these 
unnecessary risks in banking and financial institutions is one of the catalysts that led to this 
crisis.
143
  
It is disappointing to note that though the OECD principles covered most of the issues that 
were the reason for these failures, but when the need came for it to be implemented to curb 
these effects it seems as if the guidelines failed to achieve this objective. The 2004 Guidelines 
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have also been updated by the new G20/ OECD Guidelines of 2015 which have retained most 
of these elements and addressed some of the issues raised by the problems of the 2004 
Principles. 
 
3.3.4 The G20/ OECD Principles on Corporate Governance 2015 
 
In view of the issues raised against the 2004 Guidelines the new Guidelines of 2015 were 
created with new additions with principles on remuneration, risk management and an 
inclusion of institutional investors as a chapter. These principles though not tested appears to 
have addressed the issues of the 2008 crisis and are better rounded. 
 
3.3.4.1 Ensuring the Basis for an Effective Corporate Governance Framework 
 
The principle of the OECD on issues of ensuring the basis of effective corporate governance 
stipulates that: 
The corporate governance framework should promote transparent and efficient 
markets, be consistent with the rule of law and clearly articulate the division of 
responsibilities among different supervisory, regulatory and enforcement 
authorities.
144
 
 
This principle stresses that there must be an appropriate and effective legal, regulatory and 
institutional foundation established for market participants to establish their private 
contractual relations upon.
145
 It follows from the above that there is need for collaboration 
between regulatory and legal players in achieving the overall economic outcomes of the 
company.
146
 Hence the framework has to be flexible enough to meet the needs of 
corporations operating in widely different circumstances and is not a one size fits all 
approach. 
147
 This is done through a mix of regulations, laws, self-regulation and business 
practices that the companies chose themselves.
148
 This would entail that the SADC 
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framework should consider that there are small, large, listed and unlisted corporations and 
thus these are to be treated differently as opposed to one size fits all approach in the 1999 
principles. The framework also has the task of facilitating their development of new 
opportunities to create value and to determine the most efficient deployment of resources. 
149
  
Moreover, the framework must be consistent with the rule of law and in order for this 
consistency to exist there has to be consultation with government and other regulatory 
authorities and other stakeholders.
150
 This ensures that there is transparency in the companies 
which enhances the transparency of the market as a whole.
151
 Transparency is to be achieved 
through the auditing of financial reports of the companies.
152
One can argue that if there is 
transparency in SADC companies then there would be transparency in the market and hence 
might lead to better investment and sustainable companies.  
 
The element on ensuring the basis of an effective corporate governance framework also 
stipulates that the division of responsibilities among different authorities in a jurisdiction 
should be clearly articulated as well as also ensures that the public interest is taken into 
consideration.
153
 This is due to the different things that influence corporate governance such 
as company law, securities regulation, insolvency law, accounting and auditing standards, 
contract law, labour law and tax law.
154
  Moreso, the importance of stock markets is outlined 
in the 2015 guidelines on corporate governance.  The principles state that the quality of the 
stock market‟s rules and regulations that establishing listing criteria for issuers and that 
govern trading on its facilities is therefore an important element of the corporate governance 
framework.
155
 This means that the laws of each countries stock exchange are to set a standard 
on the supervision and enforcement of corporate governance in the stock exchange.
156
 The 
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issue of international cooperation is also highlighted as a necessity in cross-border ownership 
and trading which are increasing greatly.
157
  
 
3.3.4.2 The Rights of Shareholders and Equitable treatment of Shareholders and Key 
Ownership Functions 
 
The OECD principle on the rights of shareholders stipulates that:  
 
The corporate governance framework should protect and facilitate exercise of 
shareholder‟s rights.158 
  
In terms of the above principle effective corporate governance entails shareholders as owners 
have a legally recognised and divisible share of a company.
159
 It allows for the shareholders 
to have the right to convey their interest in the company. 
160
 Furthermore, shareholders are 
allowed the opportunity to participate effectively and vote in general shareholder meetings 
and should be informed of the rules, including voting procedures that govern general 
shareholder meetings.
161
 It also affords them the right to participate in, and to be sufficiently 
informed on, decisions concerning fundamental corporate change.
162
 
 
The above principles champion the idea of the protection of shareholders rights and the 
ability of shareholders to influence the behaviour of corporations.
163
 It lists some basic rights 
that accrue to the shareholders and these include the right to obtain relevant information 
about the company, to share in residual profits, to participate in basic decisions, to be 
afforded fair and transparent treatment during changes of control, and to be able to use their 
                                                 
 
157
 G20/ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Corporate Governance Guidelines (2015)17 
158
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Corporate Governance Guidelines (2004)18 
159
 Gregory J.H „Corporate Governance: What It Is and Why It Matters‟ Presented at the 9th International Anti-
Corruption Conference in Durban, South Africa (1999)9 
160
 Gregory J.H „Corporate Governance: What It Is and Why It Matters‟ Presented at the 9th International Anti-
Corruption Conference in Durban, South Africa (1999)8 
161
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Corporate Governance Guidelines (2004)18 
162
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Corporate Governance Guidelines (2004)18 
163
 Nestor S and Jesover F „OECD Principles of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Rights and Equitable 
Treatment: Their Relevance To The Russian Federation‟ Corporate Governance: An International Review 
(2001)3 
 
 
 
 
  
30 
 
 
voting rights fairly.
164
 Shareholders as the legal owners of corporations should expect to be 
able to enjoy these rights in all jurisdictions.
165
 There must also be effective corporate 
governance laws, procedures must be made and followed in order to protect this property 
right and ensure ownership, registration and free transferability of their shares in a secure 
manner. 
166
  The new additions to the 2004 principles are information technology at 
shareholder meetings, the procedures for approval of related party transactions and 
shareholder participation in decisions on executive remuneration.
167
 Of importance is the 
participation of shareholders in remuneration of executives which is a response to the failures 
of the 2004 principles pointed out above.
168
 The principles on related party transactions is 
also an important addition and it allows for the shareholders to be given a say in approving 
related party transactions, with exclusion of the interested party.
169
 Due to the different types 
of shares held by the shareholders there was a need to address the relationship between these 
types of shareholders.  The principle on the equitable treatment of shareholders holds that: 
The corporate governance framework should ensure the equitable treatment of all 
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should 
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violation of their rights.
170
 
 
The principle emphasises that all shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders, 
should be treated equitably by controlling shareholders, boards and management. Insider 
trading and abusive self-dealing should be prohibited.
171
 This would speak to issues of 
indigenisation in Zimbabwe where there is law which states that at least 51 per centum of the 
shares of every public company and any other business shall be owned by indigenous 
                                                 
 
164
 Nestor S and Jesover F „OECD Principles of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Rights and Equitable 
Treatment: Their Relevance To The Russian Federation‟ Corporate Governance: An International Review 
(2001)3 
165
 Nestor S and Jesover F „OECD Principles of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Rights and Equitable 
Treatment: Their Relevance To The Russian Federation‟ Corporate Governance: An International Review 
(2001)3 
166
 Gregory J.H „Corporate Governance: What It Is and Why It Matters‟ Presented at the 9th International Anti-
Corruption Conference in Durban, South Africa (1999)8 
167
 G20/ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Corporate Governance Guidelines (2015)5 
168
 G20/ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Corporate Governance Guidelines (2015)23 
169
 G20/ Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Corporate Governance Guidelines (2015) 
27 
170
 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2004) 20 
171Nestor S and Jesover F „OECD Principles of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Rights and Equitable 
Treatment: Their Relevance To The Russian Federation‟ Corporate Governance: An International Review 
(2001)7 
 
 
 
 
  
31 
 
 
Zimbabweans.
172
 This will lead to decisions in the company being taken by the majority 
which are the locals hence prejudicing the foreign shareholders hence the need for law to deal 
with such issues. Harmonisation through the use of the OECD as a platform will bring a 
solution to this before the law has caused damage and this can be learnt through the success 
of Russia. Although they are a communist state they have protected these rights of different 
shareholders through the assistance of the OECD.
173
 The principles also plays a great role in 
the call for transparency with respect to the distribution of voting rights and the ways voting 
rights are exercised and the disclosure of any material interests that managers and directors 
have in transactions or matters affecting the corporation.
174
 
 
3.3.4.3 Institutional investors, stock markets and other intermediaries 
 
Institutional investor, stock markets and intermediaries were for a long time not mentioned in 
the OECD Guidelines, but with the introduction of the 2015 Guidelines there is now a whole 
chapter dedicated to them. The principle on institutional investors states that 
 
The corporate governance framework should provide sound incentives throughout the 
investment chain and provide for stock markets to function in a way that contributes 
to good corporate governance.
175
 
The new principles recognise the importance of institutional investors and recommend that 
institutional investors disclose their policies with respect to corporate governance.
176
 One can 
argue that this is important in cases such as the Zimbabwean scandal of Premier Service 
Medical Aid Society (PSMAS) were directors were earning between $120 000 and $200 000 
per month.
 177
  Such a recommendation will allow for aspects such as the remuneration of the 
directors to be reported and hence such things would not go unnoticed. It also allows for 
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shareholders in the case were there are intermediaries to choose to be informed of all 
upcoming shareholder votes and may decide to cast some votes while delegating some voting 
rights to the custodian.
178
 This will ensure that their rights are safeguarded and not left at the 
mercy of the custodian. It also requires that if there is a possibility of conflict of interest the 
intermediaries should disclose this to ensure the integrity of their advice or analysis.
179
 In 
relation to stock markets the principles state that they must provide fair and efficient price 
discovery as a means to help promote effective corporate governance.
180
 
 
3.3.4.4 The Role of Stakeholders in Corporate Governance 
 
In this new dispensation of corporate governance the important characteristic of good 
corporate governance is its ability to balance the interests of the stakeholders and the 
shareholders. Stakeholders in this regard includes: employees, creditors, management, trade 
unions, suppliers, customers, future generations and the community.
181
 The principle on the 
role of stakeholders in cognisance of the above stipulates:  
 
The corporate governance framework should recognise the rights of stakeholders 
established by law or through mutual agreements and encourage active co-operation 
between corporations and stakeholders in creating wealth, jobs, and the sustainability 
of financially sound enterprises.
182
 
  
The principle states that governance frameworks should recognise that the interests of the 
corporation are served by recognising the interests of stakeholders.
183
 The principle states that 
corporations should take into cognisance the contributions of stakeholders as a valuable 
resource in the building of competitive and profitable companies which in turn contributes to 
the sustainability of the corporation.
184
 This has pushed the membership of the OECD to 
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crystallise the rights of stakeholders through numerous laws (e.g. labour, business, and 
commercial and insolvency laws) or by contractual relations.
185
 In areas where stakeholder 
interests are not legislated, many firms make additional commitments to stakeholders, and 
concern over corporate reputation and corporate performance often requires the recognition 
of broader interests.
186
 The 2015 principles support stakeholders‟ access to information on a 
timely and regular basis and their rights to obtain redress for violations of their rights.
187
 
 
3.3.4.5 Disclosure and Transparency 
 
In terms of the disclosure and transparency principle the OECD guidelines state the following  
 
The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and accurate 
disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the corporation, including the 
financial situation, performance, ownership, and governance of the company.
188
  
 
This objective is to ensure that information about the activities of the company is in the 
public domain.
189
 The annual audit is one of the mechanisms for disclosure and is the 
cornerstone of corporate governance.
190
 Disclosure needs to occur so that all shareholders 
ranging from actual to the prospective shareholders have access to timely information to 
boost their confidence.
191
 This information must be sufficiently detailed for the shareholders 
to have an overall knowledge of the overall status of the company so as to allow them to be 
confident in the managers as well as the majority shareholders among others.
192
 Disclosure 
does not only work for the shareholders but it promotes transparency which is a vital feature 
of a market-based corporate governance system.
193
 The latter translates to confidence in the 
stock market which is a key component in influencing the behaviour of companies and for 
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protecting investor rights,
194
 especially in the SADC where there is the lack of transparency 
due to insufficient or ambiguous information. This poor speculation of information hampers 
the markets ability to function thus increasing the cost of capital and discouraging 
investment.
195
 Segmental disclosure is also allowed and will be appropriate in certain lines of 
business and among geographical areas. 
196
  
The principle also recommends that the board should fulfill certain key functions including 
“aligning key executive and board remuneration with the longer term interests of the 
company and its shareholders”.197  The comments depict that it is regarded as good practice 
for boards to develop and disclose a remuneration policy statement covering board members 
and key executives.
198
 The lack of transparency and disclosure in issues of remuneration is 
the reason why there is a great deal of abuse by directors of companies in Zimbabwe. It has 
been reported that Magaya of Zimbabwe Electricity Distribution Company was pocketing a 
monthly salary of over $25,000 plus a bonus of $18,000, which translates into an annual 
salary of over $500, 000.
199
 This is why there is a need to have a corporate governance 
structure in the region to combat such behaviors by the boards of companies in SADC. 
 
3.3.4.6 The responsibilities of the Board 
 
The board is very important to the running of the company hence there is need to give 
guidelines so as to ensure the smooth running of operations. The principle on the 
responsibility of the board in relation with this function states that: 
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The corporate governance framework should ensure the strategic guidance of the 
company, the effective monitoring of management by the board, and the board„s 
accountability to the company and the shareholders.
200
 
 
The envisaged outcome in terms of the principle is that companies are to be run 
professionally but subject to effective oversight by the board.
201
 This is done so as to prevent 
self-dealing as well as ensuring that the interests of the company and the shareholders are 
taken into account by both the board and the management.
202
 It encourages the board 
members to act in good faith towards the company and the shareholders as well as taking 
their fiduciary duties seriously.
203
 Furthermore, the principles look at accounting and 
financial reporting systems of the company and stresses that there is a need for appropriate 
systems of control like systems for risk management, financial and operational control, and 
compliance with the law and relevant standards.
204
 The new principle now recommend board 
training and evaluation as well as the establishment of specialized board committees in areas 
such as remuneration, audit and risk management.
205
 This also show how the 2015 Guidelines 
seek to address the failures of the 2004 on issues of risk management and remuneration 
which were among the reasons for the financial crisis. 
 
3.4 Successes of OECD guidelines on Corporate Governance  
 
In the beginning of this chapter it was pointed out that the OECD principles on corporate 
governance have become a benchmark of best practice in the field of company governance.
206
 
This is attributed to a number of reasons highlighted below. It is also of great importance in 
this inquiry into the suitability of these principles to SADC that one should make an analysis 
into the pros and cons of the OECD principles to ensure that they are a viable platform to the 
improvement of corporate governance in the region through harmonisation. 
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3.4.1 The OECD principles are endorsed and used by other international organisations 
 
The influence of the OECD is not only limited to its members but it has also managed to 
influence other international organisations. One can note the influence of the OECD 
principles in the International Corporate Governance Network Corporate (ICGN) Global 
Governance Principles, the World Bank and Financial Service Standards. 
 
3.4.1.1 International Corporate Governance Network Corporate (ICGN) Global 
Governance Principles 
 
The ICGN originated from the merging of corporate governance initiatives in North America 
and Europe during the mid-1980s.
207
 It currently services a number of investors in the form of 
companies including: KPMG, Delloite, Pepsi and Universities like Stellenbosch in South 
Africa and London School of Business.
208
 The ICGN currently has a membership of 500 
leaders in corporate governance based in over 50 countries.
209
 The ICGN's mission is to 
inspire and promote effective standards of corporate governance to advance efficient markets 
and economies world-wide.
210
  The ICGN achieves these objectives through three main 
functions. The first of its functions is that of influencing policy by providing a dependable 
source of practical knowledge from the involved institutions and their experiences on 
corporate governance issues hence contributing to a robust regulatory framework cultivating 
circumstances that produce a mutual understanding of interests between market 
participants.
211
 It also ensures the communication between peer institutions through a broad 
array of activities at international conferences and events, virtual networking and through 
other mediums. It also informs dialogue amongst corporate governance professionals through 
the publication of policies and principles, exchange of knowledge and advancement of 
education world-wide.
212
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The ICGN and the OECD have a lot of things in common in their role of influencing 
corporate governance reform. In a report released by the ICGN a number of issues on this 
relationship are highlighted. The ICGN was one of the key players in the creation of the 
OECD Guidelines.
213
 Most of representatives serving on the OECD‟s Ad Hoc Task Force on 
Corporate Governance made reference to draft principles under discussion at the ICGN. Thus 
the ICGN and the OECD have a close relationship.
214
 
 
The ICGN in their reports have praised the OECD principles as a declaration of minimum 
best practice standards for companies and investors around the world.
215
 The ICGN also 
endorses the OECD Principles as a remarkable convergence on corporate governance 
common ground among diverse interests, practices and cultures.
216
 
 
3.4.1.2 World Bank 
 
This relationship is clear through the OECD and the World Bank agreement to work together 
on the enhancement of corporate governance through different initiatives including an annual 
Global Corporate Governance Forum and Policy Dialogue and Development Round 
Tables.
217
 
 
The World Bank also assists its member countries in strengthening their corporate 
governance frameworks. The latter is done through the Reports on the Observance of 
Standards and Codes (ROSC).
218
 The ROSC initiative seeks to assist in the creation of robust 
corporate governance policies and practices of listed companies in emerging markets.
219
 The 
ROSC reviews the country‟s legal and regulatory framework as well as the practices and 
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compliance of its listed firms and assesses the framework and practices relative to an 
internationally accepted benchmark as per the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance.
220
 
 
The ROSC assessment is divided into four parts: executive summary; capital market 
overview and institutional framework; principle by principle review and a summary of 
recommendations highlighting areas for legislative reform, institutional strengthening and 
voluntary/private initiatives.
221
 The assessments are done in such a way that they try to 
differentiate between compliance with the legal and regulatory framework and actual 
practices by the companies.
222
 This entails that each of the OECD Principles is evaluated 
according to quantitative and qualitative standards where the countries are categorised as per 
the degree of compliance.
223
  There are 5 categories which determine the compliance of the 
countries in relation to aspects of OECD guidelines and these look at whether the country 
observed, largely observed, partially observed, materially did not observed did not observed 
the different aspects of compliance.
224
 This has been done for countries such as Zimbabwe, 
Zambia, Malawi and South Africa of SADC and has exposed some of these countries‟ 
discrepancies to their frameworks as well as their application.
225
  
 
3.4.1.3 Financial Stability Standards 
 
The OECD has also been named as one of the standards of financial stability by the Financial 
Stability Standards. The standards play the important role of promoting the improvement of 
financial regulation at an international scale particularly in the Group of 20 countries 
(G20).
226
  The standards of the OECD are widely accepted as benchmarks to ensure the 
financial well-being of these countries, ensuring compliance with these standards in the 
member countries of the G20.
227
 In terms of the standards the OECD features in the 
                                                 
 
220
 McGee R Corporate Governance in Transition Economies (2008)61 
221
 ROSC Assessments available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cgoverview.html (accessed 19 June 
2015) 
222
 McGee R Corporate Governance in Transition Economies (2008)65 
223
 McGee R Corporate Governance in Transition Economies (2008)65 
224
 ROSC Assessments available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cgoverview.html (accessed 19 June 
2015)  
225
 ROSC countries available at http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg.html (accessed 19 June 2015) 
226
 Financial Stability Board available at http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/history/ (accessed 17 July 
2015) 
227
 Mandanis H et al Global Bank Regulation: Principles and Policies (2010)84 
 
 
 
 
  
39 
 
 
compendium standards of the FSB in the section that deals with Institutional and Market 
Infrastructure as a standard on good corporate governance.
228
 There are 12 standards in the 
categories on Financial Regulation and Supervision, Macroeconomic Policy and Data 
Transparency as well as the latter on Institutional and Market Infrastructure.
229
 Financial 
Regulation and Supervision and Macroeconomic Policy as a category features: Objectives 
and Principles of Securities Regulation, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
and Insurance Core Principles, Standards, Guidance and Assessment Methodology.
230
 
Macroeconomic Policy and Data Transparency has the following standards: Code of Good 
Practices on Fiscal Transparency, Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and 
Financial Policies, General Data Dissemination System and Special Data Dissemination 
Standard.
231
 Lastly, Institutional and Market Infrastructure has the following: FATF 
Recommendations on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation, Insolvency and Creditor Rights Standard, International Financial Reporting 
Standards as well as the OECD.
232
 These standards are internationally recognised and 
endorsed after thorough stakeholder and public consultation as well as endorsement by 
organisations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank.
233
 This is 
high praise which the OECD receives by being named as one of the standards and speaks to 
its effectiveness and success. 
 
3.4.2 The applicability of OECD principles on Corporate Governance to Non-members 
 
The guidelines by the OECD have had a far reaching effect in that they have managed to 
greatly influence the governance system of a lot of countries even to the extent of impacting 
on non-members. The OECD has organised 30 meetings of the Regional Corporate 
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Governance Roundtables in 18 countries.
234
 Consultations with non-member partners were 
first undertaken through meetings of Roundtables held in Asia, Eurasia, Latin America, 
Russia and Southeast Europe.
235
 The work of the Roundtables, carried out under the auspices 
of the OECD‟s Centre for Co-operation with Non-Members, is continuing through helping 
economies to develop policies to implement the recommendations of the White Papers.
236
 
The Roundtables have generated a wealth of background information and identified aspects 
of corporate governance that are of particular importance to developing and emerging 
economies.
237
 
 
This has translated to the strengthening of shareholders‟ participation in governance issues. 
This is particularly important in the context of the growing importance of pension funds as 
shareholders in the Latin American region.
238
 This has been done through the protection of 
basic rights, such the right to secure share ownership, or attending and participation in the 
general shareholders meeting which includes the right to remove board members and to 
participate in nominating them.
239
 Moreover, there has been great innovation toward better 
disclosure of the relationship between the company and the external auditor in the Latin 
America Roundtable.
240
 For instance,  Brazil, have made a policy for rotation of the audit 
firm so as to limit the non-audit services the audit firm can provide thus  increasing the 
effective liability of the firm.
241
 
In the Asian White paper the protection of stakeholders has been heightened through 
recommendations that require companies to develop policies and procedures that promote 
awareness and observance of stakeholders and those governments should also introduce 
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protections against retaliation for employees who report problems and abuses (i.e. 
“whistleblowers”).242 These are just a few instances of the improvement of how the principles 
of the OECD have played a significant role in the improvement of corporate governance in 
non-member states. However, the OECD is not without its problems. It also has a number of 
criticisms as shall be discussed below.  
 
3.5 The Criticisms of the OECD corporate governance principles 
 
The main criticism laid against the OECD principles on corporate governance relates to 
issues surrounding the global financial crisis of 2008 but this seems to have been fixed in the 
revised 2015 Principles .Other criticisms would be with regards to their applicability globally 
and in family run companies. The discussion below shall shed some light to the above issues 
so as to assess their applicability as well as the evils that the OECD principles may bring if 
applied to SADC. 
 
3.5.1 Non Compatibility with Family Business 
 
The OECD principles on corporate governance are based on a common understanding of its 
member countries.
243
 Most of the members have a number of formal institutions which have 
robust systems to ensure transparency and stakeholder involvement. This raises questions 
with regards to their compatibility with institutional contexts dominated by informal 
institutions, for instance family firms-governance.
244
 Family firms are a dominant feature in 
most developing countries including SADC countries and because these are mainly run by 
families their main objective is that of profit hence the disregard for stakeholder rights as 
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prescribed by the OECD. In order to achieve this there is a need for organised civil society so 
as to ensure stakeholder involvement and this cannot be said of most emerging markets.
245
    
 
3.6 The suitability of the OECD Guidelines in SADC Corporate Governance laws 
 
In establishing the suitability of the principles it is important to examine the successes of the 
OECD which makes it stand out the way it has and these have been outlined above. The 
OECD is one of the standards of Financial Stability
246
 and with the poverty as well as the 
poor systems in SADC corporate governance there is a need for this stability in the 
economies of SADC members.  
 
The OECD principles are a remarkable convergence on corporate governance common 
ground among diverse interests, practices and cultures.
247
 This entails that they accommodate 
all the different types of legal systems in SADC be it the Roman-Dutch system of Botswana, 
South Africa, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Swaziland the Civil Law system of Angola, 
Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo and Madagascar the Common Law system of 
Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi and Mauritius  
248
 and the hybrid system of Seychelles.
249
  The 
OECD principles would be a good fit to ensure that there is representation of the different 
legal systems. In turn this would bring predictability in the region‟s corporate governance 
which will eliminate risk in investing in SADC because of clear and predictable laws.  
Moreso, in SADC countries where the cost of legal reform is too expensive to meet their 
developmental priorities due to lack of adequate resources, the OECD can be used for that 
very purpose.
250
 The use of the OECD principles through the World Bank Reports on the 
Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSC) also in a way gets countries in a position of 
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assistance from the bank in the strengthening of the corporate governance hence it also deals 
with the issues of lack of resources for reform. 
 
Furthermore, by virtue of the fact that the principles are not law this allows for them to be 
applied without most of the politics that come with treatise and conventions. SADC has a 
history of defiance of treaties for instance the dissolution of their own tribunal due to 
countries not following its judgements.
251
 There is therefore no guarantee that they would 
respect their own laws on corporate governance. However, the OECD principles are not 
binding
252
 and they are flexible and would be applied with discretion by the members which 
would not infringe on their policies. Therefore, the upside of these non-binding laws is that 
there is a possibility that they can be accepted as they do not infringe on the sovereignty of 
the membership which has been one of the problems in the region. As mentioned in the first 
principle the guidelines allows for a mix of regulations, laws, self-regulation and business 
practices that the companies chose themselves.  It can be submitted the despite the possible 
conflict between government policies and the guidelines it is up to the companies to adopt 
them if they are not binding and this has been seen in the application of the King Reports of 
South Africa hence it can also be done in the rest of the region. The OECD also offers the 
Roundtable option which does not require membership as a prerequisite to the application of 
the principles hence because of the lack of African involvement in the OECD, SADC can use 
this avenue to improve their corporate governance laws without obligations tying them to the 
OECD. 
 
However, there are arguments that are to the contrary with regards to the use of the OECD 
principles in the harmonisation of SADC corporate governance law. There is an argument 
that the OECD principles on corporate governance are based on a common understanding of 
its member countries.
253
 In the criticisms of the OECD explained above it is pointed out that 
this would lead to issues of compatibility with SADC countries as they are mainly run 
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through the informal sector.
254
 Due to the development gap between the two; the membership 
of the OECD which is mainly European countries and SACD countries it will be expensive to 
implement the principles as there will be need for formalisation of some aspects of business 
in the countries.
255
 Furthermore, the fact that these principles are not binding raises the 
question of political will. One might find that they would be totally ignored because of 
clashes with policy for instance in Zimbabwe where there is law which state that at least 51 
per centum of the shares of every public company and any other business shall be owned by 
indigenous Zimbabweans.
256
 This will lead to principles on equitable treatment of 
shareholders being disregarded because they are not in line with their policies. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
The OECD corporate governance principles are applied  in over 30 member countries as well 
as in 5 Roundtables of non- member countries.The  principles on corporate governance are 
said to have become the international yardstick for corporate governance as they have 
successively formed the basis for a number of reform initiatives, both by governments and 
the private sector.
257
   Though this level of recognition is very commendable there is no 
African contingent in either the OECD membership or the Roundtables which raises the 
question of whether these principles are well suited for SADC.  
However, though there is no African involvement it cannot be ignored that the OECD offers a 
viable option to the improvement of corporate governance laws in the SADC region. Through 
it comes the option of non-member activity as well as assistance from the World Bank in the 
access of resource to improve corporate governance. It is no wonder why Asia, Latin 
America, Russia have chosen to use these principles to improve their corporate governance 
laws.  
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It does come with disadvantages of financial burden in the reform of systems to ensure that 
applicability is realised to its fullest on certain issues, but this can be done gradually as 
resources become available. Issues of political will and clash of policy cannot be ignored in 
its application in countries like Zimbabwe due to indigenisation, but not all countries have 
this policy and there is an option to apply what countries deem pressing at that point in time 
and if the country does not see the necessity of certain principles or have already complied 
there is no need to apply the principles. Harmonisation will play an important role in 
conjuring political will as well as the sharing of resources in updating out-dated corporate 
governance laws in SADC countries. It will also bring harmony and uniformity in the 
corporate governance laws of the region as well as the advantage of accessing updated OECD 
guidelines if ever they are updated as opposed to updating themselves after a crisis or any 
other event. 
It therefore suffices to say that though there are challenges to the use of the OECD corporate 
governance principles it is a viable option to take in the improvement and harmonisation of 
corporate governance laws in SADC. Although the OECD offers a viable option to the 
harmonisation of corporate governance laws in SADC the philosophy of African solutions 
has become a catch phrase in the African Union and the next chapter shall discuss the 
viability of the Organization for the Harmonisation of African Business Law (OHADA) as an 
African initiative on Business Law harmonisation. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE ORGANISATION FOR THE HARMONISATION OF BUSINESS LAWS IN 
AFRICA (OHADA) 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The ideology of an African solution to African problems is very important to the African 
Union.
258
 From the previous chapter it is notable that African countries have refrained from 
involvement in the OECD maybe because of the urge to bring about their own solutions to 
their problems. In business law the rise of the Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business 
Laws in Africa (OHADA) as one of the most respected institutions which deal with issues of 
the harmonisation of business law in Africa is an example of the successes towards the 
realisation of the ideal of local solutions. The OHADA came about as a result of legal 
diversity and plurality which was happening after independence of African states from 
colonialism.
259
  Prior to its commencement French colonies‟ commercial law was regulated 
by French Civil Code of 1804, the French Commercial Code of 1806 and the law of 
Commercial Companies of 1807.
260
  OHADA through unification makes modern business 
laws that are transparent, accessible, and predictable in terms of enforcement.
261
 OHADA 
laws are said to be balanced and still manage to be sophisticated and suited to encourage both 
foreign and domestic investment.
262
 OHADA has managed to improve its various Member 
States‟ legislation through modern legislation concerning business laws and hence facilitated 
investments in building towards the economic integration in the West African region.
263
   
This chapter will discuss OHADA and its institutions as an example of unification in Africa 
and also how it can be useful as far as the harmonisation of corporate governance law in the 
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SADC region is concerned. The chapter will also examine the successes as well as criticisms 
that can be levelled against OHADA in a bid to establish the plausibility of SADC Member 
States joining or making use of the OHADA laws dealing with corporate governance.  
4.2 OHADA  
 
OHADA is an exclusively business-related legal framework that was created on 17 October 
1993 in Port Louis, Mauritius. Initially, the OHADA treaty was adopted among 14 Member 
States which has grown to17 since 1993. 
264
 The first signatories were Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Côte d‟Ivoire, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. Guinea and Guinea Bissau joined later on to 
make the number 16.
265
 The Democratic Republic of Congo joined OHADA on September 
13, 2012, thereby becoming the 17th member state.
266
 OHADA enacts Uniform Acts that 
have direct effect and supersede contradictory national laws in matters of business.
267
 
 
4.2.1 Institutional Framework  
 
OHADA has an institutional framework which consists of five components: the Council of 
Ministers, the Permanent Secretariat, the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA), 
and the Regional Training Centre for Legal Officers (ERSUMA).
268
A further component was 
later added which is the Conference of Heads of State and Government.
269
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4.2.1.1 The Council of Ministers 
 
In terms of Article 27 of the Treaty the Council is composed of the Ministers of Finance and 
Justice of each member state of the organisation.
270
 The Council was structured in this way 
because it deals with both judicial matters and business issues which fall under the portfolio 
of the Ministers of Finance.
271
 In terms of Article 28 of the Treaty the Council of Ministers 
has a mandate to meet at least once a year when convened by its President on his own 
initiative or at the initiative of one third of member states.
272
 The Council also makes 
deliberations which are valid when two-thirds of the member states are represented.
273
 The 
adoption of the Uniform Acts on the other hand is only taken by a unanimous vote of States 
that are present.
274
 
The functions and duties of the Council of Ministers are administrative, regulatory and 
legislative in nature.
275
 According to Article 4 of the Treaty the Council has the powers and 
competencies to; adopt the budget of the Permanent Secretariat and the CCJA; appoint the 
Permanent Secretary and Director General of ERSUMA; approve the annual accounts of 
OHADA; elect the members of the CCJA and make the necessary regulations for the 
implementation of the Treaty.
276
 
However, though it has this vast array of duties its main function is legislative.
277
 The 
Council of Ministers acts as a legislative body and approves the annual program of 
harmonisation of business law and adopts the Uniform Acts in the place of Parliaments of the 
members.
278
 In relation to their legislative duty the Council of Ministers of OHADA has 
adopted to date, nine Uniform Acts.
279
 It has managed to enact the Uniform Act on the Law 
of Commercial Companies, the Uniform Act on the General Commercial Law, the Uniform 
Act on the Security Law, the Uniform Act on Simplified Procedures for Recovery and 
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Enforcement, the Uniform Act on Collective Proceedings for the Clearing of Debts, the 
Uniform Act on the Arbitration Law, the Uniform Act on the Organization and 
Harmonisation of Accounting of the Enterprises, the Uniform Act on Organising Secured 
Transactions and Guarantees  and the Uniform Act on Contracts of Carriage of Goods by 
Road.
280
All the Acts mentioned above override any law which deals with their subject and 
they are superior to the national laws of the member countries. 
 
4.2.1.2 Conference of the Heads of State and Government 
 
The Conference of the Heads of State and Government came about as a result of the revision 
of the treaty in 2008.
281
 The Treaty of Port Louis in 2008 did not provide the Conference of 
Heads of State so as a result of this there was a need to address this shortcoming through 
providing a Conference of Heads of State and Government as the supreme institution of 
OHADA.
282
 In relation to Article 27 it is composed of the Heads of State and Government of 
the Contracting States.
283
 The Head of State of the country which is chairing the Council of 
Ministers at a particular time is the one that chairs the Conference.
284
 A meeting by the Heads 
of State can be convened either at the initiative of the presiding country or at the request of at 
least one-third of the Member States.
285
   A vote will be valid only if at least two-thirds of the 
Member States are present at the meeting and once that quorum is reached the decisions of 
the Heads of States are adopted.
286
 In Article 27 of the revised treaty the Heads of State has 
the authority to decide all questions regarding the treaty.
287
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4.2.1.3 Permanent Secretariat 
 
The Permanent secretariat is the executive body in the OHADA institutions.
288
  In terms of 
Article 4 of the Treaty the Secretariat is headed by a Permanent Secretary who is appointed 
by the Council of Ministers for a four year term which can be renewed once.
289
 The 
Permanent Secretary as an office holder has his duties which are: to propose to the President 
of the Council of Ministers the agenda of the council meeting; the appointment of its staff; 
supervision of the ERSUMA, of which he is Chairman of the Board of Directors and to 
organise the election of members of the CCJA.
290
  The Permanent Secretariat as an institution 
including the Permanent Secretary performs the tasks of: the assessments of the areas of law 
which need to be unified, proposes them to the Council of Ministers for approval, compiles 
the annual program of harmonisation, prepare the draft Uniform Acts, coordinates the 
activities of the various organs of the OHADA and monitors the work of the organisation.
291
 
 
4.2.1.4 Common Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA) 
 
The CCJA has two main purposes; it serves as a forum for international arbitration and also 
as the court of last resort for judgments rendered and arbitral awards issued within Member 
States.
292
 The functions of the CCJA are that of interpretation of OHADA laws as well as that 
of arbitration.
293
 The CCJA has supranational power within the OHADA territory and 
operates parallel to the national system.
294
 The Headquarters of the CCJA are in Abidjan, 
Côte d‟Ivoire and it can convene at any place to solve disputes in the territory of the Member 
States.
295
 The CCJA can be a court of last instance only once the regular appeal proceedings 
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have been exhausted in the domestic courts.
296
 This entails that the CCJA replaces the 
domestic court‟s jurisdiction and its verdict can be applied in the member country. The 
decisions of the CCJA are final, cannot be appealed and are directly enforceable.
297
  
With regards to the arbitration function of the CCJA the Arbitration Uniform Act is applied 
in disputes between member states where the contract contains an arbitration clause or if 
parties agree to use OHADA principles for the proceedings.
298
 The CCJA arbitration is also 
available when one of the parties is domiciled or resident in a contracting state, or when the 
contract‟s enforcement is wholly or partially located on the territory of a Member State. 299 
However, this is not the case with SADC as Article 33 of the new Protocol on the Tribunal 
stipulates that the Tribunal will only have jurisdiction over the interpretation of the SADC 
Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between Member States.
300
 
 
4.2.1.5 Regional Training Centre for Legal Officers (ERSUMA) 
 
The Regional Training Centre plays an important part in ensuring uniformity in the 
application of OHADA law by legal professionals such as lawyers, judges, notaries, courts 
experts, registrars and other legal officers.
301
 The Centre provides training on the OHADA 
laws as well as the law of other regional bodies.
302
 The individuals who provide the training 
are chosen by the Academic Council of the Centre and they are chosen because they are 
either high-level legal professionals or academics and are hired because of their in-depth 
knowledge and experience of OHADA law and other regional laws.
303
 The training is very 
important as it allows for the efficient and proper application of OHADA laws as well as 
teaching the OHADA laws to people in their own countries.
304
 The centre is not only tasked 
                                                 
 
296
 Martor B et al Business Law in Africa: OHADA and the Harmonisation Process (2002)10 
297
 Beauchard R and Kodo M „Can OHADA Increase Legal Certainty in Africa?‟ IMF Justice and Development 
Working Paper Series  (2011)12  
298
 Beauchard R and Kodo M „Can OHADA Increase Legal Certainty in Africa?‟ IMF Justice and Development 
Working Paper Series  (2011)12  
299
 Beauchard R and Kodo M „Can OHADA Increase Legal Certainty in Africa?’ IMF Justice and Development 
Working Paper Series  (2011)13   
300
 Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v Republic of Zimbabwe  
301
 Gasti J L'effectivité du droit de l'OHADA (2006)22 
302
 Gasti J L'effectivité du droit de l'OHADA (2006)22 
303
 Martor B et al Business Law in Africa: OHADA and the Harmonisation Process (2002)17 
304
 Martor B et al Business Law in Africa: OHADA and the Harmonisation Process (2002)17 
 
 
 
 
  
52 
 
 
with the training of legal officers but is also in charge of research in African law in fulfilling 
the main task of OHADA which is that of harmonisation of law of Business Law in Africa.
305
    
4.3 OHADA Corporate Governance  
 
OHADA does not have an Act which deals with corporate governance as a subject but it does 
deal with some aspects of the subject in the OHADA Uniform Acts Relating To Commercial 
Companies and Economic interest Group (AUSCIGIE). This Acts were enacted  in 1997 but 
were further amended in 2014 so as to beef up the Uniform Acts for Security Interests, 
Cooperative Companies and General Commercial Law of 2010.
306
 It has two hundred new 
articles as well as four hundred revised provisions.
307
 
 
4.3.1 Oversight over the board Directors  
 
The Acts Relating To Commercial Companies and Economic Interest Group of 2010 contains 
good governance principles by, among other things prohibiting directors from participating in 
any vote on their own remuneration. The Uniform Acts for Security Interests, Cooperative 
Companies and General Commercial Law in terms of Article 278 stated that unless otherwise 
provided by the Articles of Association or by a meeting of shareholders the manager‟s 
remuneration shall be determined by the majority in number and capital of the 
shareholders.
308
 This would still allow the director to take part in the voting which would still 
give leeway to some kind of manipulation or abuse of power by the director. The AUSCIGIE 
in terms of Article 431 addresses this by changing the position and stating that the 
remuneration of directors is determined freely by the board of directors and the director shall 
not apart receive any further benefits with the exception of the fixed annual duty allowance 
granted to them.
309
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The AUSCIGIE also stipulates the kinds of contracts that require the prior authorisation of 
the company or its board of directors.
310
 The latter keeps the shareholders in control of the 
direction which the company will take as well as protect their interest against bad decisions 
by directors which could cause great loss such as in the instance of the 2008 financial crisis. 
Moreover, it also introduces new offences relating to the management of companies, such as 
the failure by directors to submit companies' financial statements within a month of their 
approval by the shareholders.
311
 This system is very important in ensuring that there are 
checks and balances in place on the actions of the directors. The Acts further prescribe either 
civil or criminal liability if the director associated with irregularities in issues stated above. In 
view of the above one can argue that the threat of liability keeps directors from involvement 
in illegal activity which can jeopardize the interest of the company.
312
  
 
4.3.2 Disclosure of Information 
 
The directors are required to report on the financial position and activities of the companies 
so as to ensure that every decision they made which has an impact on the finances of the 
company can be made public or questioned if it is to the benefit of the company.
313
 
AUSCIGIE provides that one or more shareholders holding at least one-fifth of the 
company's authorised capital may, either individually or as a group, petition the president of 
the competent court of the registered office of the company to designate one or more experts 
to make a report on one or more management operations.
314
 This also seeks to ensure the 
dissemination of information about the running of the company to the owners of the company 
and for them to see if their interests are being represented by the directors. 
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4.3.3 Shareholders’ Rights  
 
Article 53 of AUSCIGIE sets out the rights of shareholders which are : the right to a share of 
the company's profits whenever they are distributed; the right to the company's net assets 
when shared following the dissolution of the company or where the company's share capital 
is reduced; the obligation to share in the company's losses under the conditions laid down for 
each form of company; the right to participate in and vote on the collective decisions of the 
shareholders, unless otherwise provided by the Uniform Act for certain classes of share.
315
  
 
The AUSCIGIE also provides for the equal treatment of shareholders through the provisions 
of Article 711 which states that the auditor is obliged by law to assure the equal treatment of 
shareholders, as well as the equality of rights of all shares of the same class.
316
 This does not 
mention the protection of minority shareholders meaning that there is no recourse in the event 
of the infringement of the rights of minority shareholders. Moreso,  there has been the 
introduction of another innovation brought by the act, which is a pre-emptory right which is a 
seasonal right, exercised only in the event of new issuance of shares.
317
 For instance, if a 
shareholder holds 5 per cent of the shares of a company, in the event of new shares becoming 
available, he would be allowed to buy up to 5 per cent of the new shares at the issue price.
318
 
These rights are also safeguarded by the corresponding right of the shareholder to initiate a 
suit against a director or manager if the harm they suffer is due to an abuse of these rights.
319
 
The above is very important as it poses the threat of a suit to directors or managers if they 
disregard the rights of shareholders hence keeping them at bay in terms of their actions in 
relation to the rights of shareholders. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
315
 Uniform Act Relating To Commercial Companies and Economic interest Group 2010 
316
 Uniform Act Relating To Commercial Companies and Economic interest Group 1997 
317
 Doris L „Regionalism: Lessons the SADC May Learn from OHADA‟ Journal of Contemporary Roman-
Dutch Law, Vol. 75 (2012) 256-270 
318
 Martor B Business Law in Africa: OHADA and the Harmonisation Process (2002)94 
319
  Uniform Act Relating To Commercial Companies and Economic interest Group 1997 
 
 
 
 
  
55 
 
 
4.3.4 Appointment of Statutory Auditors 
 
As discussed in the section on the OECD one of the important elements to robust and 
effective corporate governance is transparency in the day to day running of the business. 
OHADA in ensuring compliance with the latter has in terms of the Uniform Act enacted 
provisions that force companies to appoint auditors.  Article 702 of AUSCIGIE provides that: 
Public limited companies which do not launch a public issue shall be bound to appoint 
an auditor and an alternate auditor
320
 and Public limited companies which launch a 
public issue shall be bound to appoint at least two auditors and two alternate 
auditors.
321
 
This is very important as it is not optional and forces companies to be more transparent in the 
running of the business because they can be exposed by the auditors if there is some sort of 
foul play or recklessness. The auditors also must be present at all meetings that are held in the 
company.
322
 The appointment of the auditors is done in an ordinary meeting for a period of 6 
years.
323
  In terms of Article 710 the duty of the auditor is to certify that the summary 
financial statements are regular and accurate and give a fair image of the result of operations 
of the past fiscal year.
324
 They also certify the financial situation and the estate of the 
company at the end of the fiscal year.
325
 This means that there is consistent dissemination of 
information of the financial well-being of the company to its shareholders as well as 
stakeholders.  
4.4 OHADA and SADC collaboration in the harmonisation of corporate governance 
laws 
 
As mentioned above OHADA is one of the most successful African Harmonisation 
Institutions. SADC on the other hand has not been very successful in achieving this goal and 
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can learn a number of things from OHADA or even join OHADA. One can say that OHADA 
could potentially serve as a model for the harmonisation of SADC law.
326
 
 
Article 53 of the Treaty is very important in determining the potential involvement of SADC 
in OHADA. It states that the Treaty is open to membership of any member State of the OAU 
that is not a signatory to the Treaty as well as to any non-member State of the OAU invited to 
accede by agreement of all the States Parties.
327
 This in theory would allow for the joining of 
SADC countries or their ascension to the treaty thereby inheriting the laws of OHADA 
dealing with corporate governance and every other law which it has drafted. The question 
would be how to go about this and whether it would succeed. There are a number of 
questions to be asked in this venture such as are countries going to join as individuals which 
would cause discord  in the circles of trade and add to the   spaghetti bowl effect as Bhagwati 
has termed it.
328
 This refers to the situation where countries are party to many agreements 
hence this undermines the effectiveness of the corporate governance as there may be 
conflicting provisions from the different agreements.  
 
Moreso, another challenge presented by SADC countries either as a collective or as 
individuals joining OHADA is that of the applicability of the Uniform Acts. OHADA in 
terms of Article 10 of the Treaty takes a hard law approach where all their Acts apply directly 
to the members, so in the event that there is a conflict the Uniform Act is applied.
329
  In 
SADC it is a bit different because they make use of Protocols which are soft law because they 
do not place legally binding obligations nor do they delegate authority to third parties to 
interpret and implement the laws.
330
 This is usually in form of the court and other institutions 
however because the SADC tribunal in terms of the new amendment does not have the power 
to make binding judgments in the case of a breach of the rules by private parties it has no 
authority in such cases..
 331
  On other hand OHADA has a fully functional hard law system 
                                                 
 
326
 Shumba T  Harmonising the Law of Sale in the Southern African Development Community (SADC): An 
Analysis of Selected Models (Unpublished thesis Stellenbosch University 2014)189 
327
 Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Laws in Africa Treaty 1997 
328
 Bhagwati J „US Trade Policy : The Infatuation with FTAs‟ World Trade Organisation Discussion Paper 
Series (1995)4 
329
 Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Laws in Africa Treaty 1997 
330
 Organisation for the Harmonisation of Business Laws in Africa Treaty 1997 
331
 Shaffer G and Pollack M „Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International 
Governance‟ Minnesota Law Review  (2010) 715 
 
 
 
 
  
57 
 
 
with a Court system in terms of the CCJA which play the role of applying, implementing and 
enforcing the Uniform Acts. In view of the above the joining of OHADA would likely cause 
problems in the application of hard law in the form of the Uniform Acts in the soft law 
system of SADC.  
 
However, there can be a way around the above issues through adoption only of parts of 
OHADA law that deal with corporate governance and using that to create a model law for 
SADC corporate governance. This would entail that SADC countries would not need to join 
OHADA but would rather be transplanting the parts of the Act that deal with corporate 
governance. However, the adoption of OHADA corporate governance law can be made via a 
process of harmonisation as opposed to the OHADA‟s unification technique because of the 
lack of political will within the SADC region. It is possible that if there is unification there 
would be a lack of compliance by the countries because of the reconstituted Tribunal will not 
have jurisdiction in private matters. An examination of the successes and the failures of 
OHADA are also important in establishing the viability of its corporate governance laws in 
assisting the harmonisation of SADC corporate governance laws. However this approach is 
not without its flaws as there is the debate of firstly the language, legal system as well as that 
of the pedigree of OHADA in terms of corporate governance as shall be discussed below in 
the criticisms and successes of OHADA. 
4.5 Successes and criticisms of OHADA 
 
In order for OHADA to be a suitable model for SADC in the harmonisation of its corporate 
governance one has to consider its challenges and it successes. This would be helpful in 
considering whether other states, especially those from SADC, can join OHADA. 
 
4.5.1 Criticisms of OHADA 
 
OHADA has made a lot of progress in harmonising laws dealing with other aspects of 
business law except in corporate governance. However, in terms of corporate governance 
OHADA is behind and need to improve. There are also issues of lack of diversity, language 
barriers as well as lack of funding are also weaknesses exhibited by OHADA. 
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4.5.1.1 Poor Corporate Governance Laws 
 
In comparison to legal systems that have effective corporate governance regimes such as the 
OECD as well as the King Code III of South Africa, the AUSCIGIE have a number of 
significant ambiguities that overshadow any of the corporate governance principles which are 
alluded to in the above section. 
332
 The first is that OHADA does not deal with the rights of 
workers and other stakeholders which allows for the abuse of these parties.
333
 There is also no 
clear separation between the roles of chairman of the board of directors and chief executive 
officer (CEO).
334
 In terms of the Act there is a combination of the functions and the roles of 
the CEO and Chairman of the Board in a portfolio called Administrator General.
335
 Second, 
there is the absence of independent directors to neutralize the powers of the CEOs.
336
 Thirdly, 
the mechanism for disclosure is weak because it relies heavily on the company registries 
which are inadequate and not available on online platforms, but stored manually.
337
 
Considering these frailties one cannot say that a country such as South Africa which is in 
SADC would be keen to apply the OHADA laws on corporate governance. 
 
4.5.1.2 Lack of diversity  
 
The possibility of the amalgamation of SADC and OHADA law in corporate governance is 
marred with strong criticisms. These criticisms are not new at all and they have been seen in 
the predicament of Cameroon and Guinea Bissau which are members of OHADA. The first 
notable obstacle to non-francophone African countries joining OHADA is the perceived 
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civilian nature of its laws as contained in its Uniform Acts.
338
 At the beginning of this paper  
it is mentioned that within SADC there are different types of legal systems including the 
Roman-Dutch system of Botswana, South Africa, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Namibia and 
Swaziland the Civil Law system of Angola, Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Madagascar the Common Law system of Zambia, Tanzania, Malawi and Mauritius 
339
 
and the Seychelles‟ hybrid system.340  Examples in these differences are in terms of the 
interpretation of statutes. In civil law the interpretation is from the standpoint of what the 
intention of the legislature was and in common law the interpretation can be taken from 
precedent which has been set by judges.
341
 OHADA continues to be based largely on the 
French civilian model thus it will be very difficult to persuade African countries with 
different legal traditions such as the ones mentioned above to join the organisation.
342
  SADC 
needs something that is dynamic to accommodate and apply to the different systems but 
OHADA only offers one system meaning that the others are not catered for. 
 
4.5.1.3 Language Barrier   
 
The issue of language has arisen as one of the barriers within OHADA. For instance it was an 
issue for Ghana and Cameroun which have English as one of the official languages.  These 
countries challenged the fact that French was the working language in OHADA on the 
grounds of constitutionality because other languages were treated as inferior.
343
 In terms of 
the Amendments to the treaty in 2008 it has added English, Spanish and Portuguese.
344
 
Although the Uniform Acts have been translated into and published in English, it is widely 
accepted that the English translations are not always accurate or comprehensible.
345
 It is also 
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said to create a strong incentive to conduct business in French as opposed to it conducting 
business in other languages.
346
 
 
4.5.2 Successes of OHADA 
 
Though OHADA has a number of challenges it has also managed to exhibit a number of good 
traits like healthy growth as an institution, international endorsement as well as a sense of 
clarity and uniform application of the law. These are very commendable victories on the part 
of the organisation which can be influential in harmonisation of SADC corporate governance 
laws if OHADA is to be used as a blueprint. 
 
4.5.2.1 Legal certainty and uniformity 
 
At the beginning of this paper one of the reasons stated for this research was to address the 
unpredictable nature of most of the laws in the SADC region because of the failure of the 
organisation to realise the importance of a regional law on corporate governance. OHADA 
laws are predictable and because they are followed as well as applied by all the members, 
investors and individuals know how, as well as which law will be applied. These laws are 
also accessible to different parties to a dispute as well as legal professionals through the 
Regional Training Centre for Legal Officers. For instance in a matter where there is the abuse 
of shareholders‟ voting rights one can clearly refer to Article 53 of AUSCIGIE that sets out 
the rights of shareholders
347
 hence there is  no unfair advantage to either parties. 
 
4.5.2.2 International endorsement 
 
The OHADA Acts have not only been praised within West Africa alone as but has been 
praised in France as well as by the American Bar Association.
348
 The OHADA Acts have 
been praised because their laws are drafted in a modern way, they have minimised the 
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drafting of new business laws within the member states, they are written in plain and easy 
language as opposed to complex language and they have managed to keep most of their 
Uniform Acts from political issues which are likely to cause defiance by countries on grounds 
of political will.
349
 
  
4.5.2.3 Pro- Investment tool 
 
OHADA is a platform that encourages investment both on a local and an international scale. 
The Uniform Act on Companies provides for a variety of business entities through which 
commercial activities may be done.
350
 The advantage of this is that it allows for any company 
to be formed in terms of the Act.
351
The provisions on the appointment of auditors also 
safeguard the right of the shareholders by ensuring transparent running of the company. The 
latter guarantees and reassures investors of their investments.
352
 Similarly pre-emptive rights 
and double-voting provisions are also reassuring to the shareholders as it affords them the 
right to buy more shares when new shares are issued.
353
  
4.6 Conclusion 
 
The philosophy of African solutions for African problems has been very important to the 
proponents of the African Renaissance movement.
354
 OHADA is an African made 
Organisation which is making strides to harmonising business law and also encouraging 
investments in the West African region. It can however be deduced from the discussions 
above, that it does not offer a viable avenue to the harmonisation of SADC corporate 
governance laws as it does not  provide adequate guidelines on the subject.  For instance, 
OHADA corporate governance  laws are sub-par and need to be face lifted themselves so as 
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to match the current trend of stakeholder oriented laws as well as separation of offices of the 
CEO and Chaiman of the  Board to ensure that there is proper oversight and accountability. 
One can argue that it is only after the improvement of the OHADA corporate governance 
framework that it can offer guidance to other regions, including SADC.  
 
Moreso, at the beginning of this paper the issue of finding laws that strike a common ground 
among the diverse systems of laws in the SADC region was one of the priorities. It suffices to 
say that the laws of OHADA fail in this regard as they are of a civil nature which may be 
difficult to apply in hybrid and Roman Dutch legal systems. Language issues though resolved 
on paper are still an issue because of the kind of incentives they create. SADC is not looking 
only for a French contingent in terms of investment but rather all types of investment to grow 
the economy. 
 
In conclusion OHADA is not complete in its approach to the aspect of corporate governance 
and though there are a number of positives such as the rights of shareholders, including pre-
emptive rights that are incentives for shareholders to invest because they can buy more shares 
if the company succeeds, it is not the best option for the improvement of SADC Corporate 
governance.
355
 However, SADC can learn from the plain use of language in the laws of 
OHADA as well their ability to conjure up political will because of their deliberate 
abstinence from issues of sovereign privilege of countries.
356
 One of SADCs main problems 
is lack of political will, maybe because there is no clear line on its operations in relation to 
sovereign privilege. This can only be speculation, but what needs to be noted is that OHADA 
through only dealing with issues of business laws is really succeeding in ensuring 
harmonisation in the field. The next chapter will discuss the European Union which has 
become the pedigree of regional integration as well as a harmonised system of law.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CORPRATE GOVERNANCE LAWS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION (EU) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The European Union (EU) is probably one of the most advanced regional integration systems 
with a single market for products and financial services.
357
 It also has top notch harmonised 
laws in a number of fields such as Trade where the concepts of freedom of movement of 
people, freedom of movement of goods and non-discrimination among others are highly rated 
and highly encouraged. Nonetheless, corporate governance has for some time been the 
Achilles heel of this progressive regional organ. Although most of the countries are members 
and founders of the OECD the financial crisis hit the region very hard due to unforeseen 
corporate governance vulnerabilities such as excessive risk taking and poor management in 
some companies.
358
 Notwithstanding the problems in the field of European corporate 
governance as well as their lack of a single corporate governance law or model it has a 
number of directives on the modernisation of company law and the improvement of corporate 
governance as well as a green paper on the European Union Corporate Governance 
framework which has been contentious in the EU. 
 
However, the discussion of this chapter is not concerned with the problems in Europe but 
rather the lessons that can be learnt by SADC in the quest to attain a harmonised system of 
corporate governance laws. This chapter will discuss the institutional organisation of the 
European Union law and their corporate governance laws and policies and lastly what lessons 
can be learnt by SADC from European corporate governance.  
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5.2 European Union 
The European Union has not always been as big and progressive as it currently is, but it went 
through a process of evolution and growth to be the formidable organisation that it is. The 
formation of the EU can be traced to the aftermath of the Second World War. The Union was 
formed in order to avoid a war between European countries again.
359
  Europe had suffered 
greatly from the war and lost close to 50 million people.
360
 In response to the crippling results 
of the war there was a need to improve the economies of Europe and through initiatives such 
as the Marshal Plan. This was an aid package of 13 million United States Dollars made by the 
US to help Western Europe to ensure the lifting of trade barriers in the countries of these 
countries to improve their economies.
361
 In 1958 a number of other initiatives followed, 
including the Schuuman Plan. This Plan was initiated in a bid to ensure the reconciliation of 
France and Germany as well as resuscitate the German economy which had suffered greatly 
during the war.
362
 The Messina Conference followed after this and its task was the launching 
of European integration based on a common market and integration in the sectors of transport 
and atomic energy.
363
 The report from the Messina Conference was the basis for the 
Conference on the Common Market and Euratom in 1956, and led to the Treaties of Rome 
which established a European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958.
364
  
 
The European Economic Community was an economic cooperation between six countries, 
namely Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
365
 It was named 
the European Union after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and to date the 
European Union has 28 members which are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
366
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Since its inception it has managed to excel in lifting barriers to trade and other aspects and 
removing of borders as a barrier to the free moment of people.  This success can be ascribed 
to the different institutions of the EU and the discussion below will examine these 
institutions. 
 
5.2.1 European Union Institutions 
 
The institutions of the European Union are outlined in terms of Article 13 of the European 
Union Treaty and there are seven institutions namely: the European Commission; the 
European Parliament; the Council the Court of Justice of the European Union; the European 
Council; the European Central Bank; and the Court of Auditors.
367
 Their task is that of 
promoting the values of the EU, advancing its objectives, serving the interests of its citizens 
as well as those of the Member States, ensuring the consistency, effectiveness and continuity 
of its policies and actions.
368
 
 
5.2.1.1 European Council 
 
The European Council is similar to the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
Summit as well as the OHADA Conference of Heads of States in that it is a body of the 
Heads of States of the member countries.
369
 The European Council meets twice every six 
months or if it is convened by the President when the situation requires their input.
370
 The 
European Council mostly takes its decisions by consensus but in certain cases which are 
outlined in the EU treaties, it decides by unanimity or by qualified majority.
371
 
The mandate of the European Council is embodied in Article 15 which states European 
Councils is tasked with providing the necessary impetus for  development and defining the 
general political directions and priorities of the EU.
372
 The European Council also has the 
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task of revising main treaties resolving and discussing differences between member states on 
key issues.
373
 Unlike its two counterparts the SADC Summit and the OHADA Conference of 
Heads of States which have failed to act as per their mandate the Council has greatly 
succeeded in its mandate integrating countries which were rivals in World War II.
374
 SADC 
has greatly lagged behind which  is one of the reasons for this paper as they have poor 
corporate governance systems as well as very slow progress towards the goals of the 
Regional Strategic Indicative Plan. 
375
 OHADA is also in this category as per the discussion 
in the above chapter which also pointed out the frailties of its system, particularly in 
corporate governance and funding. 
 
5.2.1.2 Council 
 
The Council is the platform from which national ministers from each EU country meet to 
discuss and adopt EU law, coordinate member states‟ economic policies, develop policies, 
such as the EU‟s common foreign and security policy, conclude international agreements and 
adopt the EU budget.
376
 It operates in a way which allows national ministers responsible for 
different policy areas to represent their country and expresses its views in the Council.
377
  For 
instance, the foreign ministers will meet on foreign affairs and the environmental ministers 
will meet on environmental issues.
378
  
 
The functions of the Council are legislative as well as executive. In terms of its executive 
mandate it has the duty to draft a preliminary budget which it then forwards to the European 
Parliament and vice versa.
379
 The Council and the Parliament then each in the final round of 
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conciliation agree on a joint document by the two concerning the budget.
380
 It is submitted 
that the oversight of the European Parliament in working together with the Council is one of 
the reasons of the success because the same cannot be said for SADC and  OHADA which as 
mentioned above have the Summit and the Conference of Head of States with powers to 
make laws which are not under any supervision.
381
  
 
5.2.1.3 European Parliament 
 
The European Parliament represents the citizens of the EU similar to the conventional 
manner in which members of Parliament in countries represent the interests of their people.
382
 
The European Parliament is the only EU institution that is directly elected. In terms of Article 
14 of the Lisbon Treaty the European Parliament has three roles with the main role being a 
legislative role with the budgetary and political functions being its other roles.
383
 The 
European Parliament acts in collaboration with the Council to create legislation.
384
 The two 
have the task of approving the proposal of a Commission in order for it to become EU law.
385
 
The European Parliament also has the right to accept, amend as well as reject proposed EU 
legislation.
386
 
The EU Parliament can also ensure the enacting of laws through delegation - a process called 
the power of secondary indirect legislative initiative.
387
 This occurs when Parliament requests 
the Commission to submit proposals on matters that can be considered for the creation of an 
act for the Union.
388
  It also has a control function in that it has to provide oversight to the 
Commission as the Parliament is responsible for the Commission and the Parliament can 
forward a motion of no confidence in the Commission.
389
 It can be argued that this ensures 
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interest of the citizens of the Union are respected by the Commission as well as 
representation of these interest as the parliament cannot act without the input of the people 
who voted for them - unlike in SADC where there is no oversight of the Summit as well as of 
the OHADA Conference of Heads of States. 
 
5.2.1.4 European Commission  
 
The European Commission is made up of its President and seven Vice-Presidents who are 
chosen from the commissioners. The commissioner are chosen from each member state of the 
EU. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy is also 
part of the leadership of the Commission and is more concerned with the foreign policy of the 
Union.
390
 The Commission has three main categories of duties which are the legislative, 
executive as well as the role of being the guardian of the legislative reform.
391
 The legislative 
function of the Commission is established through the provisions of Article 18 (2) of the 
Treaty on the European Union which states that the Union may adopt the legislative Acts of 
the High Representative of EU Foreign Affairs on the basis of a Commission proposal unless 
the Treaties provide otherwise.
392
 This is quite puzzling because on the other hand there is the 
presence of European Parliament which conventionally would be the one responsible for 
legislative reform of a country or in this instance the Union. 
In relation to the executive function of the European Commission this body has a mandate to 
supervise, manage and implement the policies of the EU which includes the handling of the 
finances of the Union.
393
 The European Commission‟s guardianship function over legislative 
reform can be seen through its powers in terms of the Treaty of the European Union to 
initiate infringement proceedings against countries or individuals who do not comply with 
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European law.
394
 This may be said to be too much responsibility for one institution however 
it is not the question of this paper.  
 
5.2.1.5 Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) 
 
The Court of Justice has a judge from each Member State as well as assistance from nine 
Advocates-Generals. It also includes the General Court which has at least one judge per 
Member State.
395
 It is tasked with the uniform observance, interpretation and the application 
of the Union‟s Treaties.396 The jurisdiction of the Court of Justice encompasses actions 
brought by a Member State, an institution or a natural or legal person to give preliminary 
rulings at the request of courts or tribunals of the Member States on the interpretation of 
Union law.
397
 It also examines the validity of acts adopted by the institutions; and apply the 
law in other cases provided for in the Treaties.
398
 
 
The Court of Justice, similar to its counterpart the Common Court of Justice and Arbitration 
in OHADA, applies the supremacy principle which stipulates that if there is a conflict 
between EU law and national law the law of the Union shall be applied.
399
 This does not 
apply to SADC because the Tribunal deals with disputes between states and not individuals. 
This means that if an act on corporate governance is enacted any dispute between the state 
and companies, or companies and third parties, this will not be heard by the Tribunal and 
hence there is no recourse for breaching the principles of corporate governance. Therefore the 
Tribunal has to be given powers to hear such disputes because most disputes over 
irregularities in corporate governance involve legal persons and not states. Without the 
Tribunal having jurisdiction to adjudicate on these matters it would be futile to improve 
corporate governance laws that will not be enforced.  
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5.2.1.6 European Central Bank (ECB) 
 
In relation to most regional integration initiatives the structure that has set the EU apart from 
other upcoming initiatives is the existence of the European Central Bank which is an 
independent central bank for the Eurozone.
400
 The ECB controls the monetary policy of the 
Union to ensure price stability and has the exclusive right of issuing the Euro.
401
 Furthermore, 
the European Central Bank may sometimes perform a legislative function because of its input 
in all proposed Union Acts and all proposals for regulation at national level within the areas 
falling under monetary policy and other issues falling within its domain.
402
 
 
5.2.1.7 Court of Auditors (ECA) 
 
The Court of Auditors is the independent external audit institution of the European Union.
403
 
The ECA has one national of each Member State chosen from independent individuals who 
are required to perform their duties only in the Union‟s general interest.404 The ECA checks 
that the Union‟s income has been received correctly as well as the legitimacy of the 
expenditure, and that financial management of the Union has been sound.
405
 This cannot be 
said for SADC and OHADA whose financial integration has not advanced to that extent, but 
however does not mean that the finances of these cannot be audited and the audit of these 
organisations can be a lesson that can be learnt from the ECA. 
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5.3 The European Union Corporate Governance efforts 
 
As mentioned above corporate governance in Europe has been one of the things which have 
not progressed as well as many of the other initiatives of the EU. It is shocking how the 
continent that makes up most of the OECD discussed in chapter 2 cannot create their own 
corporate governance system. However, there have been a number of initiatives towards 
harmonised and improved corporate governance in Europe which have been initiated. The 
initiatives are the following: the Modernisation of company law and improvement of 
corporate governance, the 2003 European Commission‟s Action Plan, the European Union 
Corporate Governance Green Paper which led to the 2012 European Commission‟s Action 
Plan and the recent Commission‟s measures package of 2014.406   
 
5.3.1 Modernisation of company law and improvement of corporate governance in 
Europe 
 
The modernisation of company law and improvement of corporate governance law initiative 
set out to encourage the improvement of corporate governance through the cooperation of 
member states in issues of corporate governance.
407
 The main objectives were to strengthen 
shareholders' rights and protection for employees, creditors and the other parties with which 
companies deal, while adapting company law and corporate governance rules appropriately 
for different categories of company as well as to foster the efficiency and competitiveness of 
business, with special attention to some specific cross-border issues.
408
 In terms of corporate 
governance it dealt with four areas which were enhancing corporate governance disclosure, 
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strengthening shareholders‟ rights, modernising the board of directors and co-ordinating 
corporate governance efforts of Member States.
409
 
 
Unfortunately, though the draft had a number of noble initiatives they did not get enough 
approval from the Union. The Union rejected the idea of a European Union Corporate 
Governance Code.
410
 However, the draft was not totally discarded but the aspects of 
disclosure of remuneration of directors as well as statements on the payment of the directors 
were retained.
411
 These were adopted as some of the issues up for discussion in the 2003 
European Commission‟s Action Plan. 
 
5.3.2 European Commission’s Action Plan 2003 
 
The 2003 Action plan also suggested key improvements to the aspect of corporate 
governance in the Union.
412
 It advocated the use of the „comply or explain‟ rule, a model 
board to facilitate employee participation 
413
 and a remuneration policy.
414
 
 
5.3.2.1 Comply or explain     
 
The „comply or explain‟ rule states that listed companies in a country are to explain their 
reasons for non-compliance with the corporate governance codes of the country. This has 
been seen in the King Code II of South Africa.
415
 The code states that entities are required to 
make a statement as to whether or not they apply the principles and then to explain their 
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practices.
416
 The importance of this is that it this could expose a director to liability if the 
statements of compliance to principles are made but the best practices are not followed and 
are not explained.
417
 This could be what is needed in the SADC laws to ensure that there is 
compliance as it is stated in chapter 3 that unification would not work in the region.  
However, South Africa has moved to „apply or explain‟ which is not about just mindless 
compliance but looks at how the codes and principles can be applied with regards to the 
company.
 418
 It is more refined than the „comply or explain‟ rule and would be a worthy 
addition to the SADC harmonised law. 
 
5.3.2.2 Employee Participation  
 
The 2003 Action Plan was also a major effort towards the participation of employees of the 
company. As mentioned in chapter one the stakeholder theory has become the driving force 
of modern day corporate governance and hence this move was highly commendable in 
realizing this objective of this theory. This was done through the European Company Statue 
Societas Europaea which added obligatory worker involvement at European level 
particularly by including participation rights at company board level.
419
 This would be a 
worthy addition to SADC law in ensuring the protection of employees. Recently in a 
judgment in the case of Nyamande & ors v Zuva Petroleum in the Zimbabwe Supreme Court, 
the court allowed for the dismissal of employees with just a 3 months‟ notice without giving 
reasons.
420
 This led to mass dismissals and showed that there is a need for reform in the rights 
of employees and the best platform to do this will be through a harmonised law which 
includes the participation of the employees in the board to safeguard their interests. 
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5.3.2.3 Remuneration Policy 
 
The 2003 Action Plan also led to the adoption of the 2004 recommendations on directors‟ 
remuneration.
421
 The recommendation on directors‟ remuneration requires that the directors 
have to disclose their salaries as well as the principles that the company uses to determine this 
remuneration.
422
 In 2010 some of these aspects were clarified in a remuneration directive. A 
directive is a legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve.
423
 
However, it is up to the individual countries to decide how.   
 The above directive states a remuneration policy should aim at aligning the personal 
objectives of staff members with the long-term interests of the credit institution or investment 
firm concerned.
424
 It states that the assessment of the performance-based components of 
remuneration should be based on longer-term performance and take into account the 
outstanding risks associated with the performance.
425
  
 
After the 2003 Action Plan was implemented, the Union sought to move towards a 
harmonized system of corporate governance though a Green Paper on EU corporate 
governance. 
 
5.3.3 Green Paper on EU corporate governance 2011 
 
In the year 2011 the Commission conducted research and drafted a new Green Paper on EU 
corporate governance. It focused on three areas, some of which were an improvement of 
some of the elements mentioned above. The three areas were: transparency and information 
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for shareholders, effective application of the abovementioned „comply or explain‟ rule as 
well as supporting growth and competitiveness.
426
 
 
The green paper pointed out that shareholders lacked engagement with companies and this 
meant that they could not hold the management to account for its performance.
427
 The Green 
Paper recommended that the board had to appoint an independent expert to provide an 
impartial opinion on the terms and conditions of related party transactions to the minority 
shareholders.
428
 In terms of the „comply or explain‟ the Commission pointed out that there 
was poor transparency and in order to ensure that there was better compliance there was a 
need for the better explanation as well as application of the principle.
429
 The Green Paper, 
similar to every other initiative which tried to harmonise corporate governance it was not 
approved because there were a number of things that failed during public participation.  
However, one of the important aspects which can be learnt from this paper by the SADC 
region is that of the balance of minority shareholders rights for instance this would protect 
foreign investors in countries with nationalistic views which allow for the majority 
shareholders to be nationals of the countries as mentioned in previous chapters in relation to 
the Zimbabwe Indigenisation Act. The Green Paper was followed by the 2012 Action Plan. 
 
5.3.4 European Commission’s Action Plan 2012 
 
In response to the issues raised in the 2011 Green Paper the 2012 Action Plan was drafted 
and it dealt with enhancing transparency, engaging shareholders and simplifying cross-border 
operations of EU companies.
430
 However for the purposes of this discussion not all aspects 
will be discussed but only those which have not been covered above. 
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5.3.4.1 Enhancing Transparency 
 
The Action Plan dealt with a number of aspects on the subject of transparency. It pointed out 
the need for boards to give broader consideration to the entire range of risks faced by their 
company.
431
 So in order for this to be done the Commission suggested that there should be an 
extension of the reporting requirements to include non-financial parameters in an effort to 
provide a comprehensive risk profile of the company, enabling more effective design of 
strategies to address those risks.
432
 The Commission argued that such non-financial reporting 
would encourage companies to adopt a sustainable and long-term strategic approach to their 
business.
433
 African countries including those in SADC are in need of sustainable businesses 
to improve their economies. There is a lack of foresight in the running of businesses and 
companies do not survive for a long life span because of risks taken to make quick money 
due to poverty hence such reporting would be important in addressing this challenge.  
 
5.3.4.2 Shareholder rights 
 
The Commission argued that in dealings where the company contracts with its directors or 
controlling shareholders and may cause prejudice to the company and its minority 
shareholders the oversight of the shareholders must be strengthened.
434
 This initiative sought 
to safeguard shareholders‟ interests from abuse by other shareholders as well as from 
directors in transaction which involve them. This is a very common thing in Africa including 
Southern Africa were directors enter into agreements with their own companies and 
overcharge commodities to make a profit. Hence such a provision would be vital in 
safeguarding against such behaviour. 
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The 2012 Action Plan was followed up by the recent 2014 package which has proposed a 
number of amendments of the directive on shareholder rights so as to codify the suggestions 
which were given. 
 
5.3.5 Commission’s measures package of 2014 
 
The Commission‟s package is the latest move by the European Union in trying to beef up 
their corporate governance framework. It deals with three areas in the directive on 
shareholders‟ rights which are remuneration, shareholder engagement and enhancing 
transparency.  
 
5.3.5.1 Remuneration 
 
The proposal to amend the directive of 2010 states that the general meeting of shareholders 
will be authorised to vote on the remuneration policy for the managing directors.
435
 This is 
called a “say on pay” policy, whereby shareholders will have the right to vote on a 
company‟s remuneration policy in respect of directors.436  Moreover, the remuneration policy 
should be submitted to the general meeting for approval every three years.
437
 Listed 
companies must prepare a remuneration report with an overview of the remuneration awarded 
to each individual managing director.
438
  This seeks to curb the problem of the abuse of office 
by directors who end up paying themselves exorbitant salaries which are not linked- to their 
performance or the work that they have done for the company similar to the way in which it 
is being done in Zimbabwe as discussed in the beginning of the paper. 
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5.3.5.2 Enhancing transparency 
 
In terms of the aspect of transparency the Commission‟s proposal recommends that there 
must be rules of disclosure. The Commission states that proxy advisors, asset managers and 
institutional investors have to be regulated by these disclosure recommendations. 
439
   
For instance, proxy advisors are required to publicly disclose certain key information related 
to voting and to their clients and the listed companies concerned on any actual or potential 
conflict of interest.
440
 In terms of institutional investors, they are required to disclose to the 
public how their equity investment strategy is aligned with the profile and duration of their 
liabilities and it contributes to the medium to long-term performance of their assets.
441
 Asset 
managers are also required to disclose on a half-yearly basis how their investment strategy 
and implementation contributes to medium to long-term performance of the assets of the 
institutional investor.
442
 
 
5.3.5.3 Shareholder Engagement 
 
In relation to shareholder involvement the Commission reiterated the need for involvement of 
shareholders in related party transactions.  The Commission gave a detailed explanation of 
these types of transaction. As an example it states that transactions with  a related party 
representing more than 5% of their assets or that may have a significant impact on profits or 
turnover are submitted to a vote by the shareholders in a general meeting.
443
 As mentioned 
above the inclusion of this is very important in curbing prejudice by directors or majority 
shareholders who offer a service or product. 
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5.4 Criticisms and Successes of the EU corporate governance regime: Lessons to be 
learnt by SADC 
  
As mentioned above the EU has been against a number of corporate governance 
harmonisation initiatives. However there are a number of lessons that can be learnt from most 
of their initiatives.  Though it only has proposals and action plans these have managed to 
speak to present day issues post the 2008 financial crisis. 
 
5.4.1 Criticisms of EU corporate governance  
 
As mentioned above the EU has not managed to harmonise their corporate governance law. 
The laws are haphazard and countries are left to improve their own laws on corporate 
governance. SADC needs a concrete model set of laws which deals with the subject in a well-
rounded manner. Snippets of laws on remuneration, shareholders rights, transparency among 
others though very detailed cannot be used for the SADC region as most of the laws are 
outdated and poorly drafted hence there is a need for a complete review to beef up their 
corporate governance.    
 
Moreover one can argue the development gap raises questions with regards to the 
compatibility of EU frameworks with institutional contexts dominated by informal 
institutions, for instance family firms.
444
 As mentioned in the chapter dealing with the OECD  
that there are a lot of informal business in SADC which will possibly not fall under the scope 
or even be discussed in the European Frame work simply because these are no longer 
relevant in EU countries. 
 
5.4.2 Successes of EU corporate governance 
 
The EU corporate governance drafts plans and proposals fill the gaps created by the OECD 
2004 Guidelines on Corporate Governance. One would argue that these paved way for the 
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2015 OECD Guidelines which deal with the issues of remuneration as well as risk which 
were some of the problems which led to the financial crisis. Moreover though EU corporate 
governance seems stagnant one can note that there is extensive consultation as well as 
research on these issues. It has gone through thorough discussion and is dynamic as it keeps 
moving with the times as well as the issues in the region. This is an attribute that is needed in 
SADC so as to create robust corporate governance laws or any other laws.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
If one is to examine the corporate governance of the EU it could be said that it leaves a lot to 
be desired because of the lack of corporation between the members. In view of the issue at 
hand which is that of the harmonisation of SADC corporate governance law the EU drafts 
offers snippets of laws that can be used post the financial crisis corporate governance and 
though these maybe excellent other issues are not covered hence it is not a viable option. 
However, a lot can still be learnt from the thorough nature of the law-making process as well 
as the efficiency of the institution of the EU. The next chapter will present conclusions as 
well as recommendations as to how SADC can harmonise the corporate governance laws. 
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CHAPTER 6  
A HARMONISED SADC CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Throughout this paper an analysis of the OECD, OHADA and the EU corporate governance 
systems have been provided in the bid towards the harmonisation of SADC corporate 
governance laws. This chapter will review the conclusions and arguments raised in chapters 
2, 3, 4 and 5 so as to recommend models that can be followed in the harmonisation of SADC 
corporate governance.  
 
6.2 OECD 
 
The OECD principles on corporate governance are the international yardstick for corporate 
governance as they have successively formed the basis for a number of reform initiatives, 
both by governments and the private sector.
445
 The guidelines have managed to influence key 
corporate governance policies internationally and also in different countries such as South 
Africa in the form of the King Code III, the Olivencia Code of Italy and the Peterson report in 
the USA. However, though Southern Africa and Africa at large are lagging behind in 
corporate governance there are no OECD members from the continent. 
 
Even though there is no African involvement it cannot be ignored that the OECD offers a 
viable option to the improvement of corporate governance laws in the SADC region. Through 
it comes the option of non-member activity as well as assistance from the World Bank in the 
form of access to resources to improve corporate governance. It is no wonder why Asia, Latin 
America, Russia have chosen to use these principles to improve their corporate governance 
laws.
446
 SADC is a poor region and the help of the World Bank through the non-member 
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system would be very important in the harmonising of the corporate governance laws in the 
region.  
 
It is also important to note that the OECD offer a harmonised system of corporate governance 
laws which is neutral to all legal systems. As mentioned at the beginning of the paper SADC 
has diverse legal systems and through the adoption of the OECD Guidelines there is a 
neutralisation of all these differences and thus one system which takes into account all of the 
systems is used. Moreover, it makes sense to adopt the OECD Guidelines because most of the 
big investors in African companies are from countries in Europe, USA and China and all 
these are members of the OECD or in the case of China active non-members.
447
 Thus 
predictability will play a great role in boosting investments because there is a law that is 
common amongst the countries hence there will be no need for the investors to pay experts to 
research the corporate governance of SADC countries but they will be aware of the system.  
However, this does not mean that SADC must adopt the OECD Guidelines without 
considering some of the things that will not apply to SADC countries. 
 
6.3 OHADA 
 
In the spirit of „Africanising Africa‟s solutions‟ OHADA has proven to be a good platform in 
issues of harmonisation of Business Laws in its members states. It has managed to enact the 
Uniform Act on the Law of Commercial Companies, the Uniform Act on the General 
Commercial Law, the Uniform Act on the Security Law, the Uniform Act on Simplified 
Procedures for Recovery and Enforcement, the Uniform Act on Collective Proceedings for 
the Clearing of Debts, the Uniform Act on the Arbitration Law, the Uniform Act on the 
Organization and Harmonisation of Accounting of the Enterprises, the Uniform Act on 
Organising Secured Transactions and Guarantees  and the Uniform Act on Contracts of 
Carriage of Goods by Road.
448
All of which has direct application in member countries and 
are superior to the national laws of the member countries on any of these subjects.  
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However, in comparison to legal systems that have effective corporate governance regimes 
such as the OECD as well as the King Code III of South Africa, the AUSCIGIE has a number 
of significant ambiguities including inadequate protection of shareholder rights,  no clear 
separation between the roles of chairman of the board of directors and CEOs, there is the 
absence of independent directors to neutralise the powers of the CEOs , the mechanism for 
disclosure is weak and there is a lack of legal diversity in the OHADA laws hence the laws 
favour a civil law system. Though there are some successes in other aspects of law that 
SADC can learn from, OHADA corporate governance laws need a boost in order for it to be 
an option for the harmonisation of SADC corporate governance.  
 
However in light of the concept of African solutions a lot can be learnt from the South 
African King Code III which has been lauded around the world. Therefore, one can argue that 
because the King III has elements of the OECD Guidelines it is a viable option for SADC 
harmonisation in corporate governance. Though it has not been discussed in detail in this 
paper one cannot ignore it especially because it is also a country from SADC and what better 
solution than that of a member state.   
 
6.4 EU 
 
The European Union (EU) is arguably one of the most advanced regional integration systems 
with a single market for products and financial services.
449
  It has harmonised laws in a 
number of fields, including Trade where the concepts of freedom of movement of people, 
freedom of movement of goods and non-discrimination among others are highly rated and 
highly encouraged. Nonetheless, corporate governance has for some time been the Achilles 
heel of this progressive regional organisation. It is clear from the discussion in chapter five 
that corporate governance has not been harmonised, However a few aspect thereof  have been 
improved such as the „say on pay‟ policy, whereby shareholders will have the right to vote on 
a company‟s remuneration policy in respect of directors.450  There has also been the 
emergence of the „comply or explain‟ principle which also places pressure on the 
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management to explain their reasons for not applying corporate governance principles if they 
chose not to do so. The EU drafts offers snippets of laws that can be used post the financial 
crisis corporate governance and though these maybe excellent other issues are not covered 
hence it is not a viable option. Only the relevant snippets may be included in the harmonised 
SADC law. 
 
6.5 Recommendations 
 
In view of the discussion above, one of the viable options is that of going the OECD route 
where SADC can use the non-member system to harmonise corporate governance in SADC. 
However, one cannot ignore some of the positives from the other systems that have been 
mentioned above which are also important and should be reflected in the SADC law. Hence 
the substance of the law must be an amalgamation of the OECD, OHADA, and EU rules as 
well as the King Code III in order to bring out a balanced law. For instance the King Code III 
apply or explain principle, the say or pay policy in the EU, the OHADA statutory auditor 
principle as well as disclosure principle of the OECD may be included in this law. 
 
Since corporate governance law has such an impact an amendment of the Protocol on Finance 
and Investment
451
 to include corporate governance could be a way to harmonise corporate 
governance in SADC. In order for the amendment of the Protocol to occur any Member State 
may propose the amendment to the Executive Secretary of SADC for preliminary 
consideration by Council after all Member States have been notified.
452
 The amendment to 
this Protocol can then be adopted by a decision of three quarters of the Member States of 
SADC.
453
 This protocol is already responsible for some of SADC‟s corporate governance 
efforts in the form of corporate governance in the central bank discussed in the second 
chapter and could be said to be a starting point for SADC corporate governance. 
454
 This 
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would be a good option which does not include that drafting of a new law but the issue of 
three quarters majority would be a problem among countries to vote in favour of it.
455
 
 
The second way to harmonise corporate governance in SADC would be through a Protocol 
on SADC corporate governance. A Protocol is a legally binding document committing the 
SADC states to the objectives and specific procedures stated within it. A Protocol requires a 
two thirds of the Member States to ratify or sign the agreement to make it officially valid.
456
 
However, one has to be mindful of the fact that there will be no enforcement mechanism with 
the new position regarding the jurisdiction of the Tribunal.  In Article 33 of the new Protocol 
it stipulates that the Tribunal will only have jurisdiction over the interpretation of the SADC 
Treaty and Protocols relating to disputes between Member States.
457
 The problem is that most 
issues on corporate governance will be between private individuals hence there will be no 
recourse at that level for the breach of the protocol hence it is very difficult to argue that 
viability of a Protocol on Corporate Governance without an enforcement mechanism. 
However, there might be hope if the Protocol on the Tribunal is amended to include such 
issues but this would be wishful thinking considering the case of Mike Campell v 
Zimbabwe.
458
 
 
The last and most viable option would be an introduction of a Model Law on Corporate 
Governance which is a soft law and is not binding on member countries. An example of such 
would be that SADC Model Law on Electronic Transactions and Electronic Commence 
which was adopted by the SADC Ministers of Telecommunication, Post and ICT to enhance 
electronic commerce in the region by improving and modernising national laws.
459
 This in 
view of the circumstances would be the best and most viable option in a fragmented system 
such as SADC. One can note that even the CISG and OECD Guidelines on Corporate 
governance among others are soft law themselves and have a great following and are 
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succeeding in their fields. Since there is no possibility of the enforcement of a Protocol if it is 
enacted a Model law would not need enforcement as it is a Soft law but will guide the 
countries in improving their corporate governance laws.  
 
6.6 Content of the Model Law on SADC Corporate Governance 
 
The SADC harmonised law must take the form of a model law which is based on the content 
of the OECD with aspects taken from the King Code III the OHADA and EU where the 
OECD fails or is unclear in its law.  
 
The OECD 2015 Guidelines on corporate governance look to be watertight with the addition 
of guidelines on institutional investors, remuneration of directors and risk management. It 
seems quite difficult to argue the presence of loopholes in the guidelines.  However, an 
innovation worth mentioning in the OHADA is the presence of statutory auditors in the 
companies. This enhances the transparency in the companies in the region in relation to their 
financial reporting. This could be a worthy inclusion in the SADC Model law. Moreover , the 
King Code III apply or explain rule is a worthy addition because unlike the comply or explain 
rule of the new OECD rules  it shows that it‟s not about just mindless compliance but is there 
to consider how the principles and recommendations can be applied in the context of each 
company.
460
 The King code III has also gained credibility with regards to Small Enterprises 
(SME) as well as Family business. One of the criticisms which is outlined about the OECD 
was that it failed to address the need of SMEs. The King code III for example recommends a 
charter for the board of directors that indicates their responsibilities and duties which has to 
be performed by small SMEs, including the owner operators.
461
 In addition to the above it has 
provisions on external auditors and company secretaries which can be applied to SME‟s.462 
Another worthy addition from European law would be the inclusion of aspects from the 
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European Company Statue Societas Europaea which added obligatory worker involvement at 
European level particularly by including participation rights at company board level.
463
  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
In conclusion though the option for a Model Law has been chosen as the most viable in line 
with the realities in the SADC region, it should be mentioned that the ideal would have been 
a Protocol which could be enforced in the event of non-compliance with the law, but due to 
the position of the Tribunal it is not possible. SADC must learn from the EU and OHADA 
institutions which have succeeded in the administering of their laws within the member states 
as well as their discipline and political will to follow their community laws so as to move 
forward as a region. 
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